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THE NFL PLAYER, THE SCHOOLCHILD, AND THE
ENTERTAINER: WHEN THE TERM “FREE
SPEECH” IS TOO FREELY SPOKEN, EXACTLY
“WHO’S ON FIRST?”
First Amendment Speech Protections and State Actors: The Haves and
the Have Nots.
CHRISTIAN KETTER*
ABSTRACT
As America’s media and politicians continue to debate the free speech rights of
NFL players, schoolchildren, and entertainers, the dialogue has confused many
Americans as to what exactly the First Amendment protects. Chief Justice John G.
Roberts ultimately assumes the role of an umpire in many of these issues, guiding the
United States Supreme Court to incrementally “call balls and strikes.” In recent years,
the Court has umpired employment rights and state action cases, and Roberts’s calls
will likely further distance the Court that decided Morse v. Frederick from the one that
decided Tinker v. Des Moines. Amid a flurry of misleading headlines and confusing
free speech doctrines, many Americans simply wonder, when the umpire calls, who’s
on first?
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PREFACE
In the late 1930s, American comedians Bud Abbott and Lou Costello immortalized
a quintessential combination of baseball, comedy, and confusion that came to a
recurring question, “Who’s on First?” Below is an excerpt:
Costello: I love baseball.
Abbott:

We all love baseball.

Costello: When we get to St. Louis, will you tell me the guys' names on
the team, so when I go to see them in that St. Louis ballpark, I'll
be able to know those fellas? . . .
Abbott:

Who is on first!

Costello: Well, what are ya asking me for?
Abbott:

I'm not asking you. I'm telling you. Who is on first.

Costello: I'm asking you who’s on first.
Abbott:

That's the man's name.

Costello: That’s who’s name?
Abbott:

Yes.

Costello: Well, go ahead and tell me.
Abbott:

Who.

Costello: The guy on first.
Abbott:

Who!

Costello: The first baseman.
Abbott:

Who is on first!

Abbott and Costello used baseball as a vehicle for a comedy duo of confusion
when they honed their iconic routine. Years later, John G. Roberts followed their cue
and used baseball as a metaphor for judicial review in his 2005 confirmation hearing
for the Supreme Court before the Senate. Roberts stated, “I have no agenda, but I do
have a commitment . . . it’s my job to call balls and strikes and not to pitch or bat.”1
This Article shows that as America continues to face questions of First Amendment
free speech rights, its news outlets have created and perpetuated confusion over
exactly “Who’s on First?” It shows the differences of free speech rights among NFL
players, schoolchildren, and entertainers as well as how the Roberts Court could
potentially call the constitutional balls and strikes for schoolchildren, and bring some
closure as to “who” actually has First Amendment free speech rights.
First, Part II.A reviews the controversies surrounding recent national anthem
protests and discusses the speech rights of NFL players. Then, Part II.B shifts gears
and moves the conversation into the schoolhouse to analyze the rights of school
1

Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 48 (2005).
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children by providing a lineage of cases that led to the Roberts Court’s 2007 decision
in Morse v. Frederick. This Part suggests potential changes that the Roberts Court may
generate by analyzing the ideologies of the individual Justices on student-speech
rights. Part II.C addresses the rights of entertainers, the impact of social media within
the entertainment industry, and the use of the Star-Spangled Banner as a source of
First Amendment controversy. This Part reviews the constitutionality of legislative
attempts to regulate national anthem performances. Finally, Part III briefly concludes.

I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past several years, the American media has heavily covered conduct and
utterances that some have defined as First Amendment “free speech,” over
controversial subjects involving the National Football League (NFL),2 American
schoolchildren,3 and Roseanne Barr,4 among others.5 However, not all of what could
qualify as speech under the First Amendment is in fact protected under that
Amendment as “free speech.” America saw NFL players silently protest during the
national anthem by kneeling.6 It saw its schoolchildren march out of school in protest
of recurrent school shootings.7 It also saw comedian Roseanne Barr’s television
comeback in “Roseanne,” which was, however, canceled shortly after because of
Barr’s racially-charged tweets.8 All the while, media outlets and elected officials
2

Stuart P. Rothman, Letter: Nothing Confusing About Exercising Free Speech, THE
MEADVILLE TRIBUNE (Sept. 22, 2018), https://www.meadvilletribune.com/opinion/letternothing-confusing-about-exercising-free-speech/article_ec63e1ae-bcf0-11e8-b49acf8d9f4c22e1.html; see also Kneeling Is a Form of Free Speech Protected by the First
Amendment, KENTUCKY KERNEL (Oct. 11, 2017), www.kykernel.com/opinion/kneeling-is-aform-of-free-speech-protected-by-the/article_64289330-aec2-11e7-a02f-9b3e53103372.html;
contra Paul Callan, There Is No Constitutional Right to Take a Knee While You’re at Work,
CNN (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/26/opinions/first-amendment-footballprotest-callan-opinion/index.html.
3

Jacey Fortin, High School Students Kicked Off Football Team After Protesting During
National Anthem, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/02/us/highschool-national-anthem.html.
4

Danielle Miller, Roseanne Barr's Firing Raises Questions Over Freedom of Speech and
Acceptable Use of Social Media, FOX 10 PHOENIX (May 29, 2018),
fox10phoenix.com/news/arizona-news/roseanne-barr-s-firing-raises-questions-over-freedomof-speech-and-acceptable-use-of-social-media.
5

Symmonds v. Mahoney, 243 Cal. Rptr. 3d 445, 448 (Ct. App. 2019); see also Tal Kopan,
Palin
Defends
‘Duck
Dynasty’
Star,
POLITICO
(Dec.
19,
2013),
https://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/sarah-palin-duck-dynasty-defense-101319.
6

Fortin, supra note 3.

7

Christian Ketter, A Second Amendment in Jeopardy of Article V Repeal, and “AMFIT,” A
Legislative Proposal Ensuring the 2nd Amendment into the 22nd Century: Affordable
Mandatory Firearms Insurance and Tax (AMFIT), A Solution to Maintaining the Right to Bear
Arms, 64 WAYNE L. REV. 431, 437 (2019).
8

Miller, supra note 4.
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weighed in on purported “free speech,” leaving mixed rhetoric surrounding
constitutional protections, and necessitating a succinct analysis of the who, what,
where, when, and how for First Amendment free speech rights. 9 In light of the
ramifications from such acts, some NFL players contended “that the NFL [would
violate] their speech rights by compelling them to stand during the national anthem.”10
Some school administrators rallied fervently against the protests of public
schoolchildren, who walked out in light of the Parkland school shooting in Florida,
threatening the students with harsh discipline in the event of a walkout.11 Moreover,
some supporters of Roseanne Barr contend that the network violated her First
Amendment freedom of speech rights when they canceled her show.12
This Article assesses the prevalent misconceptions of First Amendment rights. It
covers constitutionally-misinformed elected officials and government administrators,
the media outlets that have attempted to correct such errors in the public’s
understanding of those rights, and news outlets that have erred on these issues. It also
analyzes arguments through which protections could be imposed against private
entities and the constitutionality of regulating the national anthem, as proposed by
elected officials. Most importantly, between the NFL player, the schoolchild, and the
entertainer, this Article settles the current landscape for the haves and have nots of
free speech rights, and discusses possible changes to come.
Free speech is a relevant and active issue appearing before the United States
Supreme Court.13 In 2018, Justice Alito wrote on behalf of the Court that “most of
our free speech cases have involved restrictions on what can be said, rather than laws
compelling speech.”14 Nevertheless, the local press is often the best available means
for nonlawyers to understand the First Amendment outside of written court opinions
or legal scholarship, and beyond that of the parchment’s plain words.15 For First
Amendment understanding, “the local paper is a better way to reach the public than

9

Kopan, supra note 5; see also LZ Granderson, ‘Duck Dynasty’ Star’s Free Speech Rights
Weren't Violated, CNN (Dec. 20, 2013), https://www.cnn.com/2013/12/19/opinion/grandersonduck-dynasty/index.html.
10

Phil Cicoria, Roseanne and NFL Protesters: What Are Their Speech Rights?, ILLINOIS NEWS
BUREAU (May 31, 2018), https://news.illinois.edu/view/6367/656419.
11

Karma Allen, Texas Superintendent Vows to Suspend Students Who Walk Out to Protest
Guns, ABC NEWS (Feb. 22, 2018), https://abcnews.go.com/US/texas-superintendent-vowssuspend-students-walkout-protest-guns/story?id=532689552.
12

Cicoria, supra note 10; see also John Enger, The ‘Roseanne’ Reaction: What Protections
Does the First Amendment Actually Afford?, MINNESOTA PUBLIC RADIO NEWS (May 30, 2018),
https://amp.mprnews.org/story/2018/05/30/reaction-roseanne-barr-what-protections-does-thefirst-amendment-afford.
13
14

Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2464 (2018).
Id.

15

Douglas F. Duchek, Constitutional Law: The Right of Access to the Press, 50 NEB. L. REV.
120, 120 (1971); see generally First Amendment (U.S. Constitution), N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/topic/subject/first-amendment-us-constitution (last visited Mar. 5,
2019).
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such familiar media as broadcasting facilities or picket lines.”16 However, such
guidance in constitutional rhetoric and discourse, has led to a desultory American
understanding of the First Amendment and its guaranteed “freedom of speech.”17
Among such problematic speech analysis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s
MIT Technology Review reported that “[f]ree speech means all speech is free unless it
butts up against libel law, and that’s the end of the story.”18 The Arizona Daily Star
reported that “[f]ree speech means that we all can say whatever we want free from
government interference.”19 As astutely noted by the Washington Post, journalistic
attempts to synthesize the First Amendment for readership become an Icarian effort to
make black-letter and broad what is instead a nuanced and continually-developing
progeny of history and court-precedent. Author Megan McArdle reported:
If you write a column about athletes kneeling during the national
anthem, you can expect to find yourself rapidly mired in debates about free
speech. Because speech is (we lightheartedly hope) nuanced and complex,
there will always be an element of “I know it when I see it” in placing cases
into “protected” or “unprotected” categories. Which means we could spend
the rest of our lives arguing about just what free speech means — and,
frankly, we probably will.20
McArdle shows that one difficulty for journalists is the inevitable combination of
confusion and finite character space. Journalists must synthesize a full curriculum of
constitutional law into a few paragraphs on a single news page. Similarly, the Chicago
Tribune published a letter, in which author Janice Cody wrote, “[t]he right to free
speech is a right to speak without fear of retaliation from the government. It guarantees
people the right to express their opinions about the government, . . . government
policies and actions without fear of being jailed or fined.”21 Cody gave a large caveat

16

Duchek, supra note 15, at 120.

17

Lata Nott, Does it Really Matter That Americans Don’t Know Exactly What the First
Amendment
Says?,
FREEDOM
FORUM
INSTITUTE
(July
12,
2018),
https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/2018/07/12/does-it-really-matter-that-americans-dontknow-exactly-what-the-first-amendment-says/.
18

Karen Hao, Why AI is a Threat to Democracy—and What We Can Do to Stop it, MIT
TECHNOLOGY REVIEW (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/613010/why-aiis-a-threat-to-democracyand-what-we-can-do-to-stop-it/.
19

Jill Jorden Spitz, Star Editor: Your Questions About Dropping ‘Non Sequitur;’ My Answers,
ARIZONA DAILY STAR (Feb. 25, 2019), https://tucson.com/opinion/local/star-editor-yourquestions-about-dropping-non-sequitur-my-answers/article_b0f711b2-b32b-540d-8564a276548706dc.html.
20

Megan McArdle, ‘Don’t Burn the Flag’ and 11 More Rules for Free Speech, WASH. POST
(May 28, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2018/05/28/12rules-for-free-speech/?utm_term=.b4473a18e834.
21

Janice Cody, Letter: Free Speech Has Consequences, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Apr. 5, 2018),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/letters/ct-laura-ingraham-david-hogg-freespeech-20180405-story.html (emphasis added).
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to her definition, however, by noting to readers that “[n]ot all speech is unfettered.”22
Therefore, given the variety of claims and explanations, for NFL players,
schoolchildren, and entertainers, two issues remain. First, remains the status of those
rights in their respective contexts of exercise. Second, is what changes, if any, the
Roberts Court could generate as its Chief guides the calling of balls and strikes ahead.

II. ANALYSIS
In order for an act to constitute a violation of an individual’s right to free speech,
the party who censors must be a government actor or act with the color thereof.23
Simply put, the Bill of Rights does not apply to private conduct between private
individuals. Moreover, the greater Constitution seldom regulates private action unless
such conduct affects the public to a great extent (such as a private establishment—
e.g., a restaurant—attempting to racially-discriminate, which can be regulated via
Congress’ commerce powers).24 In any case, while the media may react similarly for
professional athletes, students, and entertainers, the courts analyze each differently for
constitutional purposes.

A. The NFL Player
Colin Kaepernick, the former quarterback and second-round pick for the San
Francisco 49ers, took to kneeling in protest during the national anthem.25 Following
a mix of praise and criticism in response to Kaepernick’s on-field protest, The
Telegraph lamented that America offers “a higher premium to four militaristic verses
about rockets’ red glare and bombs bursting in air than it does to essential freedom of
speech.”26 Conversely, some news outlets noted that freedom of speech does not apply
in this private context, and consequently, the NFL players were not entitled to the
“legal right” of constitutionally-guaranteed freedom of speech.27 In spite of what may
seem to some like straightforward constitutional analysis, headlines have appeared,
such as “NFL Owners Just Made a Mockery of All the Talk About Players’ Free

22
23
24

Id.
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 619 (1991).
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 300 (1964).

25

Colin Kaepernick’s Lawyer Says He Will be Signed in Next 10 Days, THE ATLANTA
JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.ajc.com/sports/colin-kaepernick-lawyersays-quarterback-will-signed-next-days/A2SeO7tAUGkHl5odDqDY9N/.
26

Oliver Brown, Colin Kaepernick Shows That Freedom of Speech Is an Anomaly in America,
THE
TELEGRAPH
(Sept.
8,
2016),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/americanfootball/2016/09/08/colin-kaepernick-shows-that-freedom-of-speech-is-an-anomaly-in-a/.
27

Callan, supra note 2; Kneeling Is a Form of Free Speech Protected by the First Amendment,
supra note 2.
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Speech Last Season” in Esquire Magazine.28 Other outlets, such as the Boston Globe,
are more nuanced to suggest that these athletes “live in a free country where you can
speak your mind.”29 Like the Globe, the Chicago Tribune ran a headline that “the NFL
tramples on First Amendment values.”30 Even so, the rights and values of a free
country are largely fumbled when an NFL player enters the private context of
employment.

1. The NFL: An Endzone for the Bill of Rights in a Private Context of
Employment
The NFL is a private corporation and not a public entity.31 Therefore, the NFL’s
representatives, employees, and fans inside its stadiums do not bear First Amendment
protections to shield actions and utterances within that environment. Rather, such
conduct is subject to penalty and infraction, termination of employment, or ejection
from the stadium. Among what could be banned, for instance, is “Tebowing,” a phrase
coined after NFL player Tim Tebow would famously take a knee on the football
field.32 Tebow’s kneeling, however, was not in protest, nor in celebration, rather, as
Tebow put it, “I never did it to celebrate a touchdown . . . . It was never something I
did to take away from somebody else. It was just something I did with a personal
relationship with my God.”33 Tebow, spoke about players kneeling in protest, “I think
when people believe in something and they stand for that, I don’t knock them for
that.”34 Nonetheless, whether kneeling in protest, or “Tebowing”—as it were—to
express religious devotion (another First Amendment-protected act), all is censorable
in the private arena of the NFL.
28

Jack Holmes, NFL Owners Just Made a Mockery of All the Talk About Players’ Free Speech
Last Season, ESQUIRE (May 23, 2018), https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/a20886232/nflplayers-kneeling-fines-free-speech/.
29

Jeremy D. Goodwin, Free Speech for Colin Kaepernick? Shut Up!, BOSTON GLOBE (Sept.
1, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2016/09/01/free-speech-for-colin-kaepernickshut/wKBLg4YbQOBjwRNTBdQuJI/story.html.
30

Dahleen Glanton, In New National Anthem Policy, the NFL Tramples on First Amendment
Values,
CHICAGO
TRIBUNE
(May
28,
2018),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/columnists/glanton/ct-met-dahleen-glanton-memorialday-flag-20180525-story.html.
31

Drew Harwell & Will Hobson, The NFL Is Dropping its Tax-Exempt Status. Why That Ends
Up
Helping
Them
Out.,
WASH.
POST
(Apr.
28,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2015/04/28/the-nfl-is-dropping-its-taxexempt-status-why-that-ends-up-helping-themout/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.f9339105f505.
32

Josh Peter, Tim Tebow Not Happy About ‘Tebowing’ Being Brought into National Anthem
Protests
Debate,
USA
TODAY
(June
8,
2018),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/2018/06/08/tim-tebow-kneeling-nationalanthem/686533002/.
33
34

Id.
Id.
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When it comes to private employment, such is the case for NFL players, there
generally is no constitutional right to free speech in that environment.35 However, in
the interests of states’ rights, states may increase the ceiling of guaranteed rights and
prohibit an employer from suppressing speech, as “the Federal Constitution [is said to
serve] as a floor, not a ceiling, for civil liberties and civil rights.”36 For instance,
Connecticut prohibits employers from suppressing an employee’s First Amendment
rights, unless the exercise would “substantially or materially interfere with the
employee’s bona fide job performance or the working relationship between the
employee and the employer.”37 However, Connecticut, with all its statutory deference
to employees, lacks an NFL team.38 Nevertheless, California, in which Kaepernick
was a quarterback,39 has a state labor statute that limits the firing of employees who
exercise their constitutional rights.40
California’s limitation requires that “[i]n order to establish a claim of wrongful
termination in violation of public policy,” one must prove that the termination violated
“policy that is ‘(1) delineated in either constitutional or statutory provisions; (2)
‘public’ in the sense that it ‘inures to the benefit of the public’ rather than serving
merely the interests of the individual; (3) well established at the time of the discharge;
and (4) substantial and fundamental.”41 On a federal level, however, there exists no
such showing to be made. Therefore, while there is no federal protection, other states
could extend speech protections to athletes, similarly to California. Without state
protections, however, NFL players are treated as typical employees.
In the general employment sense, Forbes accurately headlined to readers that
“Your Free Speech Rights (Mostly) Don’t Apply At Work.”42 It provided three major
potential exceptions in the context of employment: government employers,
associations of “concerted activity,” and private employer actions affecting only a
certain class of people.43 Turning back to the NFL, curiously, Stewart Harris,
Professor of Constitutional Law at the Appalachian School of Law and radio-host of

35

Gregory J. Ossi, Kishka-Kamari McClain, & Jacqueline Warner, Proceedings of the 33rd
Annual Institute: §6.04. State Laws, 33 ENERGY & MIN. L. INST. 6.04 (2012).
36

Helen Hershkoff, State Constitutions: A National Perspective, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 7, 11
(1993).
37

CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51q (1983).

38

Teams, NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, https://www.nfl.com/teams (last visited Apr. 3,
2019) (the official digital links to all 32 NFL teams).
39
40
41

Colin Kaepernick’s Lawyer Says He Will be Signed in Next 10 Days, supra note 25.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 96 (West 2000).
Barbee v. Household Auto. Fin. Corp., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 406, 412 (Ct. App. 2003).

42

Tom Spiggle, Your Free Speech Rights (Mostly) Don’t Apply at Work, FORBES (Sept. 28,
2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomspiggle/2018/09/28/free-speech-work-rights/amp/.
43

Id.
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“Your Weekly Constitutional,”44 stated that “the NFL – right now – could fire every
single person who kneels at these protests. The NFL is a private entity. These are
private relationships they have with the players. The only legal problem they might
have is whatever the contract says [that] they have with that particular player.”45
Professor Harris stated that the individual NFL contracts likely contain “morals
clauses,” which provide “that if the player does something either on the field or off
the field that puts the NFL in a bad light, [or] could harm the NFL . . . they can be
terminated.”46 He clarified that NFL protests are not a constitutional issue, “it does
involve free speech, but in a private context where the Constitution doesn’t protect
anybody.”47

2. A Blitz: the NFL as a State Actor?
For private environments, state action exists only if there is such a “close nexus
between the State and the challenged action” that seemingly private behavior “may be
fairly treated as that of the State itself.”48 There exists an argument that NFL players
are not truly a private context of employment because NFL employers accept
subsidies.49 For instance, the NFL’s tax-derived subsidies have helped to fund football
stadiums in Minneapolis, Minnesota and Atlanta, Georgia at an amount of $700
million.50 However, many American industries receive subsidies; such as the
industries of oil, gas, airline, and farming, to name a few. 51 Additionally, the federal
government has notably bailed out the industries of auto and finance. 52 The issue

44

Stewart Harris, WVTF, https://www.wvtf.org/people/stewart-harris (last visited Mar. 20,
2019).
45

Stewart Harris, Say What?, Your Weekly Constitutional, WVTF (Jan. 2, 2019),
https://www.podomatic.com/podcasts/ywc/episodes/2019-01-02T08_19_34-08_00.
46
47
48

Id.
Id.
Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001).

49

Chris Isidore, NFL gets billions in subsidies from U.S. taxpayers, CNN BUSINESS (Jan. 30,
2015), https://money.cnn.com/2015/01/30/news/companies/nfl-taxpayers/
50

Id.

51

Len Tesoro, Debunking Myths About Federal Oil & Gas Subsidies, FORBES (Feb. 22, 2016),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/drillinginfo/2016/02/22/debunking-myths-about-federal-oil-gassubsidies/#3fa26fd06e1c; see also Ashley Nunes, Government Airline Subsidies... So What?,
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becomes the threshold at which a private entity becomes a state entity. Nevertheless,
the Court has recently addressed the bounds of private parties, state action, and
constitutional rights.
In 2019, Justice Brett Kavanaugh wrote a majority opinion in Manhattan
Community Access Corp. v. Halleck, which addressed employment and free speech in
the context of state action.53 Among the majority was Chief Justice Roberts, joined by
Justices Alito, Gorsuch, and Thomas.54 In that case, Time Warner Cable system
afforded public access channels for private citizens to utilize. 55 The Court faced the
question of whether a private entity becomes a state actor by operating public access
channels on its cable system.56 It also considered whether a private citizen’s First
Amendment rights are infringed if such a private entity exercises editorial discretion.57
Kavanaugh summarized that
[t]he Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment constrains governmental
actors and protects private actors. To draw the line between governmental
and private, this Court applies what is known as the state-action doctrine.
Under that doctrine . . . a private entity may be considered a state actor
when it exercises a function “traditionally exclusively reserved to the
State.”58
The majority found a lack of state action insofar as “operation of public access
channels on a cable system,” was a “function [that] has not traditionally and
exclusively been performed by government.”59 The Court elaborated that “merely
hosting speech by others is not a traditional, exclusive public function and does not
alone transform private entities into state actors subject to First Amendment
constraints.”60 Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented with Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and
Kagan from the majority, on the rationale that the administrator “[b]y accepting [an]
agency relationship . . . stepped into the City’s shoes and thus qualifie[d] as a state
actor, subject to the First Amendment like any other.”61 In contrast, the majority
offered a floodgates argument, “[i]f the rule were otherwise, all private property
owners and private lessees who open their property for speech would be subject to
First Amendment constraints and would lose the ability to exercise what they deem to
criticizes-biden-for-taking-a-little-bit-of-credit-for-obama-accomplishments;
LAURENCE M. BALL, THE FED AND LEHMAN BROTHERS 211(2018).
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be appropriate editorial discretion within that open forum.”62 The majority affirmed
its reasoning that merely “being regulated by the State does not make one a state actor”
and “[e]xpanding the state-action doctrine beyond its traditional boundaries would
expand governmental control while restricting individual liberty and private
enterprise.”63
Alternatively, Professor Harris proposed a novel theory that it is “possible to
argue” state action potentially exists on the part of President Trump, that is,
by actively encouraging the NFL owners to fire . . . “these sons of bitches,”
as [Trump] calls them, our President has entwined the government (in the
person of himself), so closely with these private interests that, if in fact, [the
NFL owners] follow his advice and fired them, that might actually be
considered a constitutional violation because it was done at the behest of a
government actor.64
Nevertheless, as to this novel argument, Trump’s words did not give effect to any NFL
changes and did not achieve ripeness. Harris settled that, generally, for “right now –
no constitutional protection” exists for NFL players in their arena of private
employment.65
The Court has indeed not specifically addressed issues of employee speech rights
for NFL players. However, on a general employment level, in Garcetti v. Ceballos,
the Roberts Court ruled that “[g]overnment employers, like private employers, need a
significant degree of control over their employees’ words and actions; without it, there
would be little chance for the efficient provision of public services.”66 That majority
opinion, written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, consisted of Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Antonin Scalia.67 Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg dissented with Justice David Souter, who wrote, “I agree with the majority
that a government employer has substantial interests in effectuating its chosen policy
and objectives, and in demanding competence, honesty, and judgment from employees
who speak for it in doing their work.”68 Though the dissenters clarified, they would
hold that the employer’s “interests in addressing official wrongdoing and threats to
62
63
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Id. at 1932–34.
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health and safety can outweigh the government’s stake in the efficient implementation
of policy, and when they do public employees who speak on these matters in the course
of their duties should be eligible to claim First Amendment protection.”69 Justice
Breyer, who dissented separately, wrote also “I agree that the Constitution does not
seek to displace . . . managerial discretion by judicial supervision.”70 Breyer noted
that certain fields have professional responsibilities beyond their immediate employer,
which necessitates greater freedom in speech rights, such as those in healthcare and
law.71Breyer wrote that he dissented separately from Justices Souter, Stevens, and
Ginsburg insofar as he “agree[d] with much of Justice Souter’s analysis, . . . [but] the
constitutional standard he enunciates fails to give sufficient weight to the serious
managerial and administrative concerns that the majority describes.”72
Therefore, even if state-action could be found to exist among the NFL, the control
that the Roberts Court has recognized for employers is significant, even among the
dissenters conceding as much in Ceballos. Moreover, at a federal level, the Roberts
Court’s majority ruling to restrict the state action doctrine suggests that ultimately the
NFL would not be found to constitute a state actor, though Justices Sotomayor, Breyer,
Ginsburg, and Kagan might say otherwise. Ultimately, however, in a free speech case,
NFL players would likely be viewed as general employees and subject to the controls
of that private context.

B. The Schoolchild
Kaepernick, as a leader both on and off the field, inspired American youth to
follow accordingly in protest.73 For instance, at Louisiana’s Parkway High School,
two football players were expelled from the school’s team for protesting during the
anthem.74 The Louisiana High School Athletic Association (HSSA) supported the
coach’s decision.75 Like that of Tommie Smith and John Carlos at the 1968 Olympics,
Parkway student Cedric Ingram-Lewis raised his fist in the air during the national
anthem, while fellow student Larry McCullough took a knee (like Kaepernick).76
Similarly, in Needville, Texas, public school Superintendent Curtis Rhodes threatened
students with a three-day suspension via Facebook and wrote that the school district
“will not allow a student demonstration during school hours for any type of protest or
awareness.”77 Superintendent Rhodes stated that “[l]ife is all about choices and every
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
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choice has a consequence whether it be positive or negative. We will discipline no
matter if it is one, fifty, or five hundred students involved.”78 In 2018, a Scottsdale,
Arizona middle-school suspended forty students for leaving school property while
protesting.79 Consequently, a question looms as to what the constitutional
repercussions may be for acts similar to those taken by the Louisiana HSAA, the
Needville, Texas Superintendent, and other public schools.
The constitutional rights of schoolchildren are subject to the context of the arena
in which a student exercises those rights.80 That is, whether they perform the conduct
in a public or private setting.81 For a public school student, administrative attempts to
censor may violate First Amendment rights.82 However, for a private school student
there are no constitutional free speech rights simply because the school is not a state
actor.83 Thus, while the Warren Court pronounced in 1969 that public school students
indeed do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at
the schoolhouse gate,”84 the private school student sheds accordingly.85 Therefore,
First Amendment free speech analysis and state-actor analysis must be conducted
together with regard to cases involving students.

1. A Constitutional Lineage of Student Speech
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, the U.S.
Supreme Court required that
[i]n order for the State [acting] in the person of school officials to justify
prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show
that its action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid
the discomfort and unpleasantness . . . [of] an unpopular viewpoint.86
In the case of Tinker, in 1965, three children wore black armbands in protest of the
Vietnam war.87 The school suspended the children until they would return without
78
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armbands.88 The children waited, however, until the originally planned protest period
had expired in order to return at their own prerogative without the armbands.89
Accordingly, the children sued for injunctive relief and nominal damages in order to
advance the argument of rights centered in free speech.90
On behalf of the Court in Tinker, Justice Abe Fortas wrote a majority opinion
sympathizing with the plight of the three students, an opinion from which Justices
Hugo Black91 and John Marshall Harlan II dissented.92 Justice Potter Stewart
concurred with the majority opinion but cautioned that he “[could not] share the
Court’s uncritical assumption that, school discipline aside, the First Amendment rights
of children are co-extensive with those of adults.”93 Justice Byron White concurred
also, limiting his support, however, by disclaiming that he did “not subscribe to
everything the Court of Appeals said about free speech in its opinion in Burnside v.
Byars, . . . a case relied upon by the Court in the matter now before us.”94 White did
not specify the parts with which he refused to subscribe; however, in Burnside, the
Fifth Circuit had held that “school officials cannot ignore expressions of feelings with
which they do not wish to contend. They cannot infringe on their students’ right to
free and unrestricted expression as guarantee[d] to them under the First Amendment
to the Constitution,” so long as such exercise “[does] not materially and substantially
interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school.”95
Justice Black dissented from Tinker, however, that “public school students [are
not] sent to the schools at public expense to broadcast political or any other views to
educate and inform the public,” as “children [have] not yet reached the point of
experience and wisdom which enabled them to teach all of their elders.”96 Black
wrote, perhaps “the Nation has outworn the old-fashioned slogan that ‘children are to
be seen not heard,’ but one may, I hope, be permitted to harbor the thought that
taxpayers send children to school on the premise that at their age they need to learn,
not teach.”97 Justice Harlan, in his brief dissent, advocated for a petitioner’s burden to
show illegitimate school concerns.98 Nevertheless, the Warren Court majority forever
changed the rights of public schoolchildren.
88
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While Tinker seemed revolutionary, the path to it had a logical trajectory.
Curiously, before Justice Black dissented in Tinker, he served on the Stone Court that
laid genesis in part to the progeny of student free speech precedent. In the 1943 case
of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, amid the backdrop of World
War II and only two years after America had entered the war,99 the Supreme Court
decided that compelling public schoolchildren to salute the flag and “pledge
[allegiance] transcends constitutional limitations on their power and invades the
sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our
Constitution to reserve from all official control.”100 In Barnette, a West Virginia state
statute required that all schools, public and private, foster faith in both the United
States and the State itself.101 Consequentially, the West Virginia State Board of
Education adopted a resolution requiring students honor the Nation by saluting the
Flag of the United States.102 The Court struck down the “compulsion of students to
declare a belief,” on the rationale that “[t]hey are not merely made acquainted with the
flag salute so that they may be informed as to what it is or even what it means.” 103 In
seeming contrast from the subsequent case of Tinker, Justice Black concurred with the
Barnette majority, writing that “[n]either our domestic tranquility in peace nor our
martial effort in war depend on compelling little children to participate in a ceremony
which ends in nothing for them but a fear of spiritual condemnation.” 104 In Tinker,
however, Black (a Stone Court holdover to the Warren Court) distinguished his
Barnette concurrence from his Tinker dissent by noting that, in Barnette, the
schoolchildren had “religious scruples” against compelled classroom speech.105
Nevertheless, the Tinker majority,106 cited Barnette107 and required that in order
for a public school to penalize speech, it must demonstrate that a student’s “forbidden
conduct would ‘materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.’” 108 Otherwise, “the prohibition
99
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cannot be sustained” and the state actor cannot meet its burden.109 Once again,
however, paramount with regard to analysis of school censorship is the public or
private context in which students are enrolled.
As a preliminary matter to the progeny of student speech cases that followed
Tinker is the most famous quote to come from Justice Abe Fortas on behalf of the
Court in that case. Fortas wrote:
First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of
the school environment, are available to teachers and students. It can hardly
be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. This has been the
unmistakable holding of this Court for almost 50 years. 110
Nevertheless, in the fifty years that have followed Fortas’s words, subsequent
Courts scaled back what the Warren Court offered schoolchildren in 1969.
In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, the Burger Court examined the
constitutionality of a high school student’s suspension for giving an assembly speech
in which he spoke in support of a student self-government candidate using an
“elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor.”111 Prior to the student’s speech,
two of his teachers warned him that the speech was inappropriate and risked “severe
consequences.”112 Nevertheless, the student gave the speech, which resulted in
significant school disruption.113 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Warren E.
Burger wrote that the “First Amendment does not prevent the school officials from
determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech such as respondent’s would
undermine the school’s basic educational mission.”114 Burger distinguished Fraser
from Tinker by noting a “marked distinction between the political ‘message’ of the
armbands in Tinker and the sexual content of respondent’s speech in this case.”115
The Court stated that indeed “[t]hese fundamental values of ‘habits and manners
of civility’ essential to a democratic society must, of course, include tolerance of
divergent political and religious views, even when the views expressed may be
unpopular.”116 However, the Court qualified, “these ‘fundamental values’ must also
take into account consideration of the sensibilities of others, and, in the case of a
school, the sensibilities of fellow students.”117 Therefore, in the interests of other

109
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students, Fraser removed lewdness from Tinker’s protective ambit for the speech of
schoolchildren.
Two years after Fraser, the Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist, reviewed
another student speech case, Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.118 In
Kuhlmeier, student members of the high school newspaper alleged a First Amendment
rights violation because the school deleted sections of the newspaper that dealt with
teen pregnancy and the impact of parental divorce on students.119 Justice White wrote
on behalf of the Court that “First Amendment rights of students in the public schools
are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings, and must
be applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.”120 White
elaborated that “[a] school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its
basic educational mission, even though the government could not censor similar
speech outside the school.”121 His words echoed that of Justice Potter Stewart’s
concurrence in Tinker (with whom White concurred previously in Tinker).122
However, White distinguished Kuhlmeier from Tinker.123 He explained that in Tinker,
the Court reviewed the censorship of students’ personal expression, whereas
Kuhlmeier ventured into broader school “authority over school-sponsored
publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that students,
parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur
of the school.”124 White elaborated that activities such as a school newspaper “may
fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum, whether or not they occur in
a traditional classroom setting, so long as they are supervised by faculty members and
designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to student participants and
audiences.”125 In a broadcast for Your Weekly Constitutional, Professor Stewart Harris
stated that Kuhlmeier may be treated “effectively [as] an overruling of the Tinker
case.”126 Harris characterized the legal effect bluntly as “a loophole you can drive a
truck through.”127
Nevertheless, attempts to stifle speech may instead create more speech, such was
the case for Kuhlmeier. In spite of the principal’s attempt to censor the school news
pages in Kuhlmeier, those pages ultimately ran in the St. Louis Globe-Democrat with
118
119
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a headline “Too Hot for Hazelwood.”128 The irony of Kuhlmeier was the inevitable
more rampant exposure that flowed from efforts to censor student expression from
infecting other students.129 This evokes a flaw of censorship that James Madison
addressed in Federalist Paper No. 10, in which Madison wrote that “[i]t could never
be more truly said” that the prevention of factions is “worse than the disease” of
factions itself.130 “Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it
instantly expires.”131 Furthermore, he noted the fallacy of stifling at the hands of a
state actor, as “it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political
life,” for the only way in which government can exterminate such thoughts is to
terminate liberty.132 Such an attempt “nourishes faction” and would be as futile as for
one “to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts
to fire its destructive agency.”133 Said otherwise, the solution to contentious speech is
more speech, not less.134 Censorship fuels exposure.
In 2007, the Roberts Court addressed student free speech rights in Morse v.
Frederick, and so, announced that it had “create[d] another exception” to Tinker.135
Chief Justice Roberts elaborated that “[i]n doing so, we continue to distance ourselves
from Tinker, but we neither overrule it nor offer an explanation of when it operates
and when it does not.”136 So to say, the Roberts Court moved the posts of Tinker’s
“schoolhouse gate” without explaining where it moved them and leaving the “gate”
open for more tinkering to come.137
In Morse, high school students had gathered at a school-sanctioned viewing of the
Olympic Torch Relay, as it traveled through Juneau, Alaska to the 2002 Salt Lake City
Winter Games.138 As news cameras passed the crowd, a high school senior showcased
a 14-foot banner that stated, “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”139 The school principal ordered
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the banner to be taken down.140 However, one student refused to comply.141 The
principal confiscated the banner and ordered the student to her office. 142 She
explained after the fact that her order was pursuant to a school board policy prohibiting
the student advocacy of “substances that are illegal to minors.”143 The principal
suspended the student from school for ten days, leading to the most recent Supreme
Court case centered on student speech rights.144
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the opinion on behalf of the court and framed the case
consistently with the existing precedent for First Amendment rights in the school
environment.145 The Chief Justice rejected the argument that this was anything but a
“school speech case.”146 Rather, Roberts noted that “[t]he best [the student] can come
up with is that the banner is ‘meaningless and funny.’”147 However, curiously, Justin
Driver, University of Chicago Law School professor and author of The Schoolhouse
Gate: Public Education, the Supreme Court, and the Battle for the American Mind
opined that the student would have been much wiser to argue for his free exercise of
religion insofar as the message contained Jesus.148 Nevertheless, the student did not
do so, and Roberts ruled out hypotheticals of anything other than meaninglessness. 149
Roberts established that this was “plainly not a case about political debate over the
criminalization of drug use or possession.”150 Likewise, Roberts ruled out the school’s
argument, rejecting the advancement of a “broader rule that Frederick’s speech is
proscribable because it is plainly ‘offensive’ as that term is used in Fraser.” 151 The
Court carefully rejected using Fraser for precedential support because “this stretches
Fraser too far.”152 Fraser “should not be read to encompass any speech that could fit
under some definition of ‘offensive.’ After all, much political and religious speech
might be perceived as offensive to some.”153 Rather, the Court’s concern was “not
that Frederick’s speech was offensive, but that it was reasonably viewed as promoting
140
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illegal drug use.”154 Therefore, the Court ultimately held that “a principal may,
consistent with the First Amendment, restrict student speech at a school event, when
that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use.”155
Justice Clarence Thomas concurred with Morse’s majority, but wrote fondly upon
the days of old, stating that “in the earliest public schools, teachers taught, and students
listened. Teachers commanded, and students obeyed. Teachers did not rely solely on
the power of ideas to persuade; they relied on discipline to maintain order.”156
Moreover, Thomas did not hide his hostility for Tinker. 157 Rather, he stated, “I join
the Court’s opinion because it erodes Tinker’s hold in the realm of student speech . . .
I think the better approach is to dispense with Tinker altogether, and given the
opportunity, I would do so.”158 Given such an opportunity in the future, it is therefore
foreseeable that Thomas would vote to overrule Tinker.159 Nevertheless, among the
greater Court, it may be less than likely to see Tinker’s overturn under Chief Justice
Roberts, “who has continually evinced a desire to render unanimous narrow decisions
that further the public faith in the Court, rather than undermine it.”160
In addition to Justice Thomas, Justices Samuel Alito and Anthony Kennedy
concurred in Morse, but Alito clarified that he “d[id] not read the opinion to mean that
there are necessarily any grounds for such regulation that are not already recognized
in the holdings of this Court.”161 Alito elaborated, qualifying that “[w]hen public
school authorities regulate student speech, they act as agents of the State; they do not
stand in the shoes of the students’ parents.”162 Moreover, he continued, “[i]t is a
dangerous fiction to pretend that parents simply delegate their authority—including
their authority to determine what their children may say and hear—to public school
authorities.”163 Turning once again to the relevant subject of state actors and public
students’ free speech rights, Alito wrote, “[i]t is even more dangerous to assume that
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such a delegation of authority somehow strips public school authorities of their status
as agents of the State.”164
Justice Breyer concurred in part, under a minimalist approach, concurring insofar
as he believed that qualified immunity should simply bar the student’s claim for
monetary damages.165 According to Cass R. Sunstein, Professor of Law and former
Administrator of the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs,166
“judicial minimalism” is an approach to law by which jurists take “small steps . . .
avoiding depth and width,” in otherwise sweeping decisions, as “minimalists hope to
eliminate large decision-making burdens.”167 Moreover, Chief Justice Roberts
(characterized by some as a judicial minimalist) has advocated that “the broader the
agreement among the justices, the more likely it is a decision . . . on the narrowest
possible grounds.”168 Breyer advocated for such minimalism and narrowness, as he
urged that the Court should bar the claim and “say no more.”169 Breyer dissented on
the basis that the case’s First Amendment issue was difficult and unwarranted given
the grounds on which it could have been decided without necessitating the turn to a
constitutional basis.170
The U.S. Supreme Court’s “‘last resort rule’ dictates that a federal court should
refuse to rule on a constitutional issue if the case can be resolved on a
nonconstitutional basis.”171 To the Roberts Court majority, however, this issue of
student speech must have been an important constitutional question that had not been
adequately settled by the likes of Tinker, Kuhlmeier, and Fraser, for the “avoidance
of unnecessary constitutional decisions . . . has been explained by concerns regarding
federal courts’ credibility, the final and delicate nature of judicial review, and the
paramount importance of constitutional adjudication.”172 Moreover, the fact that
Chief Justice Roberts used his unique power to select the decision’s authorship,
assigning the majority opinion to himself, may best indicate Morse’s significance.173
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Of course, Morse was not without its dissenters.174 Justices John Paul Stevens,
David Souter, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented from the majority.175 Stevens’
dissent found a threshold between condemning the school’s justification but not
condemning the acts of the principal, as “[t]he First Amendment demands more,
indeed, much more.”176 Justice Stevens wrote that the Court “cannot justify
disciplining [a student] for his attempt to make an ambiguous statement to a television
audience simply because it contained an oblique reference to drugs.”177 Stevens
likened the controversy surrounding marijuana to the Viet-Nam rhetoric in Tinker.178
He wanted to establish a state’s burden to show that the student “willfully infringed
on anyone’s rights or interfered with any of the school’s educational programs.”179
Stevens charged that, by not requiring this demonstration in Morse, “the Court
punt[ed]” in its last case on student speech.180

2. Tinker-Morse Going Forth and the Schoolhouse Gates for Cyberbullying
and Hate Speech
Nevertheless, Justice Stevens (and his fellow dissenters) certainly did not argue
for unbridled student speech. However, there are those who do so. For instance, John
O. Hayward, Senior Lecturer in Law at Bentley University, has advocated that anticyber bullying laws are the greatest threat to student free speech. 181 Similarly,
Assistant Professor Mary-Rose Papandrea of Boston College Law School wrote that
“[g]ranting schools broad authority to censor the digital speech of their students would
unnecessarily exacerbate this risk and prove a grave threat to the speech rights of

174
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adolescents generally.”182 Papandrea qualifies, however, that “schools should not
have to tolerate lewd speech in the classroom or harassing and demeaning speech that
interferes with another student’s ability to learn.”183 Ultimately, the inevitable
challenge of establishing what is “lewd,” “harassing,” or “demeaning” may very well
beg the question and prove as quixotic as Justice Stewart’s famous attempt to define
pornography, in which he wrote, “I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds
of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps
I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it . . . .” 184
Thus, the Court would inevitably grapple with whether the likes of “BONG HiTS 4
JESUS” is student speech to warrant permissible censorship. 185 Perhaps, as the
Roberts Court “continue[s] to distance [itself] from Tinker,”186 if the right case shall
come, the Court will simply know it when it sees it.187
Nevertheless, the most fervent supporters of boundless public-school students’
free speech may be at odds with student hate speech, a complicated subject with many
layers indeed.188 For instance, at California’s Newport Harbor High School, police
were called after students had posted flyers with swastikas. 189 The flyers appeared
days after Eva Schloss, stepsister of Anne Frank, spoke to children who had posted
anti-Semitic imagery at an off-campus party.190 The Court has notably grappled with
the difficulties of regulating hate speech in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul.191 In the
unanimous decision of R.A.V., written on behalf of the Court by Justice Antonin
Scalia, the Court held a “Bias–Motivated Crime Ordinance” facially invalid because
it prohibited displays of symbols that “arouse . . . anger, alarm or resentment in others
on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.” 192 The Court ruled, however,
that certain limited categories of speech, such as obscenity and defamation “may be

182
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regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable content.”193 It qualified that
group, however, as “these categories are not entirely invisible to the Constitution, and
the government may not regulate them based on hostility, or favoritism towards a
nonproscribable message they contain.”194 Scalia elaborated that “fighting words,”
despite their verbal qualities, are not within the First Amendment’s scope because of
their unprotected nonspeech characteristics.195 Nonetheless, in R.A.V., the Court
clarified its “belief that burning a cross in someone’s front yard is reprehensible,” but
there existed “sufficient means at [St. Paul’s] disposal to prevent such behavior
without adding the First Amendment to the fire.”196
In spite of the fact that R.A.V. was unanimously decided, Justice Scalia’s majority
opinion was not without criticism from the concurring Justices. Justice Byron White
criticized the opinion in his concurrence, writing that “the majority holds that the First
Amendment protects those narrow categories of expression long held to be
undeserving of First Amendment protection.”197 White chided that “[s]hould the
government want to criminalize certain fighting words, the Court now requires it to
criminalize all fighting words.”198 Justice Harry Blackmun concurred
notwithstanding similar criticism expressed.199 Blackmun wrote that the majority
opinion “weakens the traditional protections of speech. If all expressive activity must
be accorded the same protection, that protection will be scant.” 200 Nevertheless, he
provided the ultimate reason for his concurrence was that he (like Justice White)
agreed that the Minnesota ordinance exceeded the bounds of mere “fighting words”
into protected speech.201
Justice John Paul Stevens, concurring in R.A.V., wrote that “[t]here are legitimate,
reasonable, and neutral justifications” for prohibitions on hate speech.202 Stevens
found issue, however, and stated that “the Court holds, a government must either
proscribe all speech or no speech at all.”203 Stevens wrote, nevertheless, that he found
the Minnesota ordinance overbroad, but had it not been so, he would have voted to
uphold it.204 R.A.V. demonstrated the difficulty of regulating hate speech. In fact,
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
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Justice Stevens’ rhetorical question that follows showed the fine line that ultimately
can prove fatal for prohibitions on hate speech.205 Stevens asked, is an “ordinance
‘overbroad’ because it prohibits too much speech? If not, is it ‘underbroad’ because it
does not prohibit enough speech?”206 And so, while hate speech can be regulated, the
means and extent thereof may be difficult to execute constitutionally.207 That
difficulty, however, is eased in the school environment, as Fraser allows for speech
regulation when school administrators consider “the sensibilities of fellow
students.”208
Ultimately, however, some scholars (even before Morse) have asserted that
“Tinker, Fraser, and Kuhlmeier provide no obstacle to the implementation of hate
speech regulations.”209 Rather, much “[t]o the contrary. Their rationales support
public school efforts to provide environments for learning and to safeguard the
sensibilities of elementary and secondary students.”210 Moreover, scholars argue that,
hate speech is indeed capable of regulation that is “designed to protect students and to
encourage learning,” while allowing the American public school system to “remain
true to our liberal principles of freedom of expression.”211
Some scholars and jurists look to the progeny of cases up to Morse sounded in
student free speech “as fundamental alterations of student-school relationships, or
even of the basic role of minors in society.”212 Others, like Andrew R. Lewis,
Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Cincinnati,213 have
claimed that political forces are at play and Conservatives support free speech cases,
not only “when it serves them.”214 Lewis asserts that conservative groups who once
lambasted the free speech of Cohen v. California215 now supported the student in
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Morse v. Frederick in order to “carve out space for pro-life speech.”216 Cohen
involved a 1968 arrest for disorderly conduct after the defendant wore a controversial
jacket that was decorated with the clearly visible words “Fuck the Draft” into a Los
Angeles County Courthouse.217 The Court noted albeit archaically that indeed “[t]here
were women and children present in the [courthouse] corridor,” but held nevertheless
that “the State may not, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, make
the simple public display . . . of this single four-letter expletive[,] a criminal
offense.”218 Putting aside Cohen’s anti-war sentiment for the war in Vietnam amid
the backdrop of President Richard M. Nixon’s administration,219 and referring strictly
to Professor Lewis’s assertions regarding Morse, Professor Lewis’s proposition is
supported by two important events. First, by the structure of the Morse v. Frederick
majority.220 That Court majority did not support the student221 when restricting his
speech, a majority moreover that solely consisted of conservative-appointees: Chief
Justice Roberts (appointed by George W. Bush),222 Justices Alito (George W.
Bush),223 Kennedy (Ronald Reagan),224 Scalia (Ronald Reagan),225 and Thomas
(George H.W. Bush).226 In dissent were Justices Stephen Breyer (William

216
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Clinton),227 Ruth Bader Ginsburg (William Clinton),228 David Souter (George H.W.
Bush),229 John Paul Stevens (Gerald Ford).230 Second, Lewis’s assertion is also
countered by the statements of the school principal’s appellate counsel in Morse,
retired Court of Appeals Judge Kenneth Starr, who said that the case “should not be
read more broadly.”231
Morse has, however, helped to resolve the cloudy line in lineage from Tinker for
political speech rights of students. For instance, Clovis North High School in Fresno,
California told student Maddie Mueller that she could not wear her “Make America
Great Again” hat in support of President Donald J. Trump.232 Mueller asked publicly,
“being a patriot and trying to show pride in your country, how is that
inappropriate?”233 A Clovis school district spokesperson explained the school’s
prohibition of the Trump-supporting baseball cap, stating that the “[b]ottom line for
us [is that] our dress code is really about allowing our kids to come to school, to feel
safe at school, to feel supported at school and to be free of distractions so they can
focus on learning.”234 An Opinion article in the Los Angeles Times asked, “Can kids
wear black armbands to school but not MAGA hats?”235 The Times also charged that
227
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“[i]t’s ironic that Tinker may be teetering at a time when, in other settings, children
are being praised for speaking out on political issues,” such as the walkouts for
changes in gun control following the Parkland shooting.236
Indeed, Tinker could potentially support a contemporary parallel between black
anti-war arm bands and “Make America Great Again” hats. However, with Morse, the
Roberts Court successfully “distance[d] [itself] from Tinker, but . . . neither
overrule[d] it nor offer[ed] an explanation of when it operates and when it does
not.”237 Therefore, it is not clear in what circumstances a public student can wear a
political hat and when a student cannot. Mueller has since sued the school for violation
of her First Amendment rights.238 Clovis School District’s spokesperson stated that
the high school does not prohibit all hats, and “[t]here has never been a subjective
evaluation of what language or logo is or is not on a hat, because the policy is
straightforward in allowing only school hats or hats in solid school colors.” 239 While
Mueller may argue that the school’s prohibition of some hats but not all is not contentneutral, the Court has made it clear that “regulation of expressive activity is contentneutral so long as it is ‘justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech.’”240
The Court has noted that “[t]he principal inquiry in determining content neutrality,
in speech cases generally, and in time, place, or manner cases in particular, is whether
the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the
message it conveys.”241 Government “[r]egulation that serves purposes unrelated to
the content of expression is [nevertheless] deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental
effect on some speakers or messages but not others.”242 Judge Breyer has explained
content neutrality’s purpose, insofar as it “[g]enerally, . . . prohibits the government
from choosing the subjects that are appropriate for public discussion.”243 He noted
that “content-neutrality cases frequently refer to the prohibition against viewpoint
discrimination and both concepts have their roots in the First Amendment’s bar against
censorship.”244 However, “unlike the viewpoint-discrimination concept, which is
used to strike down government restrictions on speech by particular speakers, the
236
237
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content-neutrality principle is invoked when the government has imposed restrictions
on speech related to an entire subject area.”245 It serves to fortify the core of First
Amendment protections from viewpoint discrimination.246
Thus, Clovis High School’s explanation may be both content-neutral and
consistent with Fraser that when schools censor student speech, they may do so for
“the sensibilities of fellow students.”247 Still, black arm-bands could be said to affect
student sensibilities, and without an explanation of when Tinker operates,248 the fact
remains that public schoolchildren—like Mueller—do not “shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”249
Nevertheless, while Mueller did not receive express permission to wear the hat,
she (like others who allegedly wore hats in violation of policy) has not been
disciplined.250 The student stated, “I’ve been repeatedly pulled aside by teachers and
sent to the disciplinary office, but nothing made it onto my official record because
there is no rule about Trump clothing.”251 Until, however, Mueller refuses to shed her
hat at the schoolhouse gate, she may not have a viable case, for a party must not show
not only that a government act is unconstitutional, but that she “has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its
enforcement.”252 Standing may not be established by mere “fear of enforcement.”253
Therefore, it may be in the school’s best interest to argue that Mueller is without
standing unless and until she suffers a cognizable injury, as until then, she also suffers
from a lack of ripeness.254 Furthermore, somewhat fatally to Mueller’s argument, she
has stated that the school does not enforce its policy.255 Nevertheless, for both Maddie
Mueller and Tinker, time will tell what happens. A court, acting on judicial minimalist
grounds, could bar Mueller’s action for a lack of injury, avoid the last resort of
constitutionality, and simply “say no more.”256 Such an approach would prevent
courts from being forced to re-examine the clouded line between Tinker and Morse.257
245
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3. The Roberts Court, Student Sports, and State Action
There is much focus among scholars and journalists upon the Roberts Court’s
handling of Morse and the external forces of purported political pressure.258 However,
the Brentwood cases may be a better focus for where changes could come to student
free speech rights, as those cases “shaped sports” and the function of state actors in
that environment. Due to the well-covered controversies arising in school sports
environments, these cases (and their underlying doctrine) are contemporarily relevant
to student speech rights within school athletic associations.259
In Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association, the
Rehnquist Court addressed the state action doctrine with regard to not-for-profit
athletic associations.260 In Brentwood, Tennessee had delegated the authority to
oversee the State’s high school athletics to a not-for-profit athletic association.261 The
Association regulated Tennessee’s interscholastic athletic competitions among all
schools in the State, both public and private.262 As such, it sanctioned a private school
member of its athletic association, Brentwood Academy, for violating a rule that
prohibited a high school from unduly influencing student recruits.263 All parties who
voted on the sanctions were members of the not-for-profit association as well as public
school administrators outside of the Association. 264 The private school sued the
Association in federal court under a theory that the Association’s acts to enforce
constitute sufficient state action and a violation of its First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights.265 In an opinion written by Justice David Souter, the Court held that the
“Association’s regulatory activity is state action owing to the pervasive entwinement
of state school officials in the Association’s structure, there being no offsetting reason
to see the Association’s acts in any other way.”266 This case is often referred to as
Brentwood I, as its remedial enforcement also reappeared before the Court in
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Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association v. Brentwood Academy (Brentwood
II).267
Once again, for private environments, such as school athletic associations, state
action exists only if there is such a “close nexus between the State and the challenged
action” that seemingly private behavior “may be fairly treated as that of the State
itself.”268 However, in Brentwood I, Justice Thomas dissented arguing that he saw “no
‘symbiotic relationship’ between the State and the TSSAA.” 269 When Brentwood II
reached the Roberts Court six years later, in 2007, Thomas concurred in the judgment
that there was no First Amendment violation after all, and nevertheless affirmed that
he “would simply overrule Brentwood I.”270
Since the time of Brentwood I, the composition of the Court has changed
dramatically; as in Brentwood I, the “Justices’ votes were perfectly ordered
ideologically.”271 That case consisted of a majority opinion written by “the five least
conservative:” Justice David Souter, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day
O’Connor, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer, of which only Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer remain.272 Brentwood I was countered by a dissent by “the four
most conservative,” Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Justices Antonin Scalia,
Anthony Kennedy, and Justice Thomas as the writer.273 Of those four, only Thomas,
the dissent’s author who affirmed his hostility to the opinion six years later in
Brentwood II, remains.274 Therefore, Thomas’s hostility pervades student related
cases from Tinker to Brentwood.275
According to Terri Peretti, Professor of Political Science at Santa Clara University,
the focus—with regard to changes to Brentwood I—is properly between “the
Court’s ideologically-median Justice and . . . the ideological location of new
appointees.”276 Since Brentwood I was decided, America saw the appointments of
Chief Justice John Roberts (George W. Bush 2005),277 Justices Samuel Alito (George
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W. Bush 2006),278 Sonia Sotomayor (Barack Obama 2009),279 Elena Kagan (Barack
Obama 2010),280 Neil Gorsuch (Donald Trump 2017),281 and Brett Kavanaugh
(Donald Trump 2018).282 Thus, vigilant Roberts Court observers should monitor the
trajectory of both state action and student speech developments.

4. The Roberts Court’s Potential Balls and Strikes for Schoolchildren PostMorse
If a case shall appear to settle lingering issues of free speech rights for
schoolchildren, the Justice’s past decisions may provide an indication of their potential
constitutional resolution. As an initial matter, Morse is as a strong indication of the
general manner in which the members of current Court remaining therefrom would
rule. Among those who concurred in Chief Justice Roberts opinion were Justices
Thomas and Alito.283 Breyer dissented in part.284 Ginsburg dissented.285 Among the
Justices who heard both Brentwood cases and Morse are members of its majority
Ginsburg and Breyer as well as dissenter Thomas. Among the justices from Brentwood
II and Morse are the aforementioned (that time with Thomas concurring), Alito, and
Chief Justice Roberts in a largely unanimous decision.286 Thus, Sotomayor, Kagan,
Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh are Judges who have yet to participate in addressing the
issue of student rights at the Supreme Court.

a. Chief Justice Roberts: the self-declared umpire
At his 2005 Senate Confirmation Hearing, Chief Justice John Roberts employed a
sports analogy for law, in which he opined that “Judges and Justices are servants of
278
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the law, not the other way around. Judges are like umpires. Umpires don’t make the
rules, they apply them . . . [in] a limited role. Nobody ever went to a ball game to see
the umpire.”287 Nevertheless, in baseball, the umpire has a discretionary role to rule
upon what constitutes a ball or a strike, and in so doing, effectively calls the runs and
the outs.288 Accordingly, in Morse’s oral argument, Chief Justice Roberts telegraphed
his thinking as to the purpose that Morse should serve going forth. Roberts laid out a
brief lineage of student-speech precedent, stating to Joseph Frederick’s attorney
Douglas K. Mertz:
Can we get back to what the case is about[?] You think the law was so
clearly established when this happened that the principal, [in] the instant
that the banner was unfurled, snowballs are flying around, the torch is
coming, [that principal] should have said oh, I remember under Tinker I can
only take the sign down if it’s disruptive. But then under Frazier I can do
something if it interferes with the basic mission, and under Kuhlmeier I’ve
got this other thing. So she should have known at that point that she could
not take the banner down, and it was so clear that she should have to pay
out of her own pocket because of it.289
In presenting the question as Roberts framed it, he suggested there exists a
scattered confusion in the precedent. It was one that he would course-correct in Morse.
Early on in oral argument, Roberts established that “I guess my question goes to
how broadly we should read Tinker. I mean, why is it that the classroom ought to be a
forum for political debate simply because the students want to put that on their
agenda?”290 Roberts’s use of “forum” is interesting because Tinker does not include
the conspicuous use of the term “forum;” rather, it is Kuhlmeier. The Court in
Kuhlmeier declined to extend free speech rights to public school students with regard
to a school newspaper, or a school play. Instead, according to Kuhlmeier, the student
is subject to how the school “reserved the forum for its intended purpose.”291 It
appears that Roberts may have sensed a dissonance between Kuhlmeier and Tinker.
The issue is insofar as the political speech rights that Tinker so broadly established
were limited with Kuhlmeier, but the extent is not clear as to whether a school may
limit political discourse, if the school did not intend that the classroom be a forum for
that purpose.292
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A Roberts Court’s narrowing of Tinker, guided by the Chief Justice himself, may
be foreseeable given his reservations towards Tinker and his reputation for preference
towards narrowly structured, incremental decisions, which “have the effect of making
his approach to judicial decision making transparent.”293 Roberts said at his 2005
Senate Confirmation Hearing, “I have no agenda, but I do have a commitment . . . it’s
my job to call balls and strikes and not to pitch or bat.”294 However, the Roberts
Court’s calling balls and strikes of the previous Courts from Tinker to Kuhlmeier has
positioned the Court and its umpire to steal a base towards limiting Tinker further.

b. Justice Thomas’s fierce consistency
Justice Clarence Thomas concurred separately in Morse, specifically to state that
Tinker “is without basis in the Constitution.295 Justice Thomas stated that he joined
Morse only “because it erodes Tinker’s hold in the realm of student speech.”296 He
wanted to “dispense with Tinker altogether,” and stated if “given the opportunity, I
would do so.”297 In his tenure on the Court, some have accused Justice Thomas of
surprisingly liberal opinions.298 For instance, in 2005, Justice Thomas dissented from
the Court’s decision to uphold the federal government’s ability to regulate medicinal
marijuana as a congressional commerce power in Gonzales v. Raich.299 This dissent
shocked some as liberal in nature, but as Slate reported, “[t]o careful observers,
Thomas’ ruling[s] should not come as a shock.”300 There, Thomas affirmed his
longstanding concept of Federalism to its logical conclusion of California’s right as a
state.301 He follows those principles in student speech cases as well.
Two years after Gonzalez, in Morse, Thomas joined the majority but concurred
separately to specifically articulate an originalist theory as to why student free-speech
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rights are constitutionally non-existent.302 Thomas wrote that “[i]f students in public
schools were originally understood as having free-speech rights, one would have
expected 19th-century public schools to have respected those rights and courts to have
enforced them. They did not.”303
It may be chiefly stated that one can never truly predict decisional outcomes in the
Supreme Court.304 However, Justice Thomas’s consistency, which is rooted in
principles of Federalism and the constitutional theory of originalism, 305 and taken
with his vehement rallying against Tinker, indicate safety in such predictions.

c. FACTUAL CoNTEXTS 4 JUSTICE BREYER, the goals of education, and
his pragmatism in framing cases with blunt practicality
In Morse, Justice Breyer did not find it necessary for the Court to address the
constitutional issue. Nevertheless, Judge Breyer ironically did not avoid the question
in his concurrence. There, Breyer suggested that his threshold for student speech rights
could turn on whether speech appropriate for censorship “would risk significant
interference with reasonable school efforts to maintain discipline.”306 In oral
argument, Breyer communicated that he felt it would have been “a very different case
if in fact it [BONG HiTS 4 JESUS] had been a whisper or if it had been a serious effort
to contest the drug laws.”307 However, Breyer stated, “[i]t wasn’t either. It was a joke.
It was a 15-foot banner. We have the message plus the means plus the school
event.”308
Breyer values the educational goals for children and order thereof.309 In 2011, the
Court touched upon the subject of children and the First Amendment in Brown v.
Entertainment Merchants Association when it struck down a California law that
“prohibit[ed] the sale or rental of ‘violent video games’ to minors, and requir[ed] . . .
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packaging to be labeled” for adults.310 Dissenting from a 7-2 majority, Justice Breyer
and Justice Thomas wrote respective dissents.311 While Thomas’s dissent centered on
originalism,312 Breyer framed his dissent in a practical way, stating:
This case is ultimately less about censorship than it is about education.
Our Constitution cannot succeed in securing the liberties it seeks to protect
unless we can raise future generations committed cooperatively to making
our system of government work. Education, however, is about choices.
Sometimes, children need to learn by making choices for themselves. Other
times, choices are made for children--by their parents, by their teachers,
and by the people acting democratically through their governments. 313
Breyer concluded that “[t]he statute prevents no one from playing a video game, it
prevents no adult from buying a video game, and it prevents no child or adolescent
from obtaining a game provided a parent is willing to help.”314
Therefore, for Breyer, in a subsequent student speech case, his ruling would likely
be influenced by: the factual context of the message itself; the medium of
communication; the level of disruption; and the educational mission taken in a totality
of circumstances for the merits of the speaker’s case.

d. Justice Alito’s specific potential for a switch hit on certain grounds
It is a mistake to presume that Alito would support limiting student speech simply
because he concurred in the Morse majority. Alito limited his concurrence to go no
further than upholding a public school’s restriction of speech that reasonably seems to
advocate for illegal drug use.315 Moreover, Alito disclaimed that the majority opinion
should not be read to support restriction of student speech that may “plausibly be
interpreted as commenting on any political or social issue, including speech on issues
such as ‘the wisdom of the war on drugs or of legalizing marijuana for medicinal
use.’”316 Second, outside of his concurrence, on two occasions, Justice Alito has
however expressed concern against broad restrictions on student speech. First, in oral
arguments for Morse, Deputy Solicitor General Edwin Kneedler argued on behalf of
the United States that censorship may be constitutionally permissible over students
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simply because a “school does not have to tolerate a message that is inconsistent with
its basic educational [mission].”317 Justice Alito cut Kneedler off, stating
[w]ell, that’s a very -- I find that a very, a very disturbing argument, because
schools [can] and they [have] defined their educational mission so broadly
that they can suppress all sorts of political speech and speech expressing
fundamental values of the students, under the banner of, of -- of getting rid
of speech that's inconsistent with educational missions.318
Subsequent to Morse, Justice Alito dissented alone from a denial of certiorari on
a question of student’s rights to free speech, for a Ninth Circuit case in which the Court
of Appeals affirmed summary judgment in favor of the school after it prevented a high
school senior and her fellow wind-ensemble members from performing Franz Biebl’s
“Ave Maria” at graduation, due to its religious connotations.319
In his dissent from a denial for writ of certiorari, Alito stated that “when a public
school purports to allow students to express themselves, it must respect the students’
free speech rights. School administrators may not behave like puppeteers who create
the illusion that students are engaging in personal expression when in fact the school
administration is pulling the strings.” 320 Alito cautioned that the lower court’s
decision, as left to stand, “will have important implications” because “[e]ven if the
decision is read narrowly, it will restrict what is purportedly personal student
expression at public school graduation ceremonies.”321 When concurring in Morse,
Alito stated pointedly that “the Court correctly reaffirm[ed] the recognition in Tinker
. . . of the fundamental principle that students do not ‘shed their constitutional rights
to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.’”322
Thus, of the Morse holdovers, Alito’s participation in a decision on student speech
may turn on whether the speech is political or religious, as he may uphold student’s
rights in that context. In contrast, Alito may sympathize with educators if the student
speaker is advocating for illegal conduct or acts to such an extent that demonstrates
“school officials must have greater authority to intervene before speech leads to
violence.”323 However, if Chief Justice Roberts’s goal is to bring clarity to the lineage,
adding religion into the mix would likely do anything but. Nevertheless, Alito’s
analysis dictated that when “a public school purports to allow students to express
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themselves it must respect the students’ free speech rights.”324 Therefore, if schools
did not purport to allow expression, but moved to ban all disruptive speech, Alito could
potentially support a majority on those grounds.

e. Justice Ginsburg, stare decisis, and Tinker.
Justice Ginsburg joined the late-Justice Stevens’s dissent, along with Justice David
Souter.325 Among them, she is the only Justice remaining. Stevens’s dissent stated, it
was “perfectly clear that ‘promoting illegal drug use,’ comes nowhere close to
proscribable ‘incitement to imminent lawless action.’”326 Therefore, for the Morse
dissenters, it mattered not that the banner involved illegal drugs. Nor did it matter that
it was a school event. Rather, the dissenters looked beyond the school environment to
broader grounds of Brandenburg v. Ohio, a case which affirmed “the principle that the
constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid
or proscribe [speech] . . . except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”327
Curiously, in crafting his dissent, Stevens did not acknowledge Kuhlmeier, a majority
in which he joined Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices Byron White, O’Connor, and
Scalia to “conclude that the standard articulated in Tinker for determining when a
school may punish student expression need not also be the standard for determining
when a school may refuse to lend its name and resources to the dissemination of
student expression.”328 Rather, the dissenters shifted their precedential focus
elsewhere.
The Morse dissenters noted that “[h]owever necessary it may be to modify
[Brandenburg’s] principles in the school setting, Tinker affirmed their continuing
vitality.”329 The dissenters conceded that “it is possible that our rigid imminence
requirement [under Brandenburg] ought to be relaxed at schools,” as under Fraser,
“[t]he constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.”330 Nevertheless, Ginsburg
joined a hardline stance of stare decisis regarding Tinker. This is not to suggest,
however, that Justice Ginsburg has withheld any and all hostility to student rights, as
she concurred in a 1995 judgment that upheld random drug testing for student athletes
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due in part to their “decreased expectation of privacy.”331 That decision was, however,
early in Ginsburg’s tenure on the Court, as she had taken the seat in the year before.332
Ginsburg concurred in that case, noting that she believed the constitutional question
was still reserved as to whether the student body at large may be subjected to
suspicionless drug testing.333 Still, on student speech rights, Ginsburg’s support is
wisely to be expected.
In a 2007 study of ideological shift among judges Northwestern Law Professor
Lee Epstein, Washington University Law Professor Andrew D. Martin, Harvard Law
Professor Kevin M. Quinn, and Professor of Political Science Jeffery A. Segal found
that “Justice Ginsburg reaches liberal decisions in about 60% of the Court’s cases almost exactly the [expected] percentage . . . from a Justice with her moderately leftof-center political outlook.”334 It therefore seems unlikely that Ginsburg would
support limiting Tinker any further than Morse has already, due to Ginsburg’s
Brandenburg-Tinker rationale to prohibit censorship of student speech with a nonimminent danger, and stare decisis for Tinker.

f. From John Paul Stevens to Justice Kagan, a potential swing vote and
ideological shift
The precedent by which Justice Elena Kagan’s potential opinion may be analyzed
is limited. Constitutional scholar Dean Erwin Chemerinsky noted that this is in part
because “Justice Kagan ha[d] never been on the bench” prior to her appointment, and
consequently, “there exists no body of prior judicial opinions to scrutinize, unlike
when Justice Sotomayor was confirmed.”335 Chemerinsky further noted that “[a]s a
law professor, Elena Kagan wrote only five major articles, and none of them were
particularly controversial.”336
Prior to her tenure on the Court, Justice Elena Kagan, wrote about free speech
while she was a University of Chicago Professor on leave serving as Associate
Counsel to President William J. Clinton.337 Then Professor Kagan wrote that
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[i]n recent decades, the Court almost never has upheld a regulation of
political speech. Perhaps more tellingly, almost all of the landmarks of First
Amendment law--the classic cases that set the tone and provide the focus
for analysis of free speech questions--arise out of governmental attempts to
restrict speech of an obviously political nature.338
Kagan furthered that “[i]f the goal of a free speech system is to provide individuals . .
. with the range of opinion and information that will enable them to arrive at truth and
make wise decisions, then a tiered system of speech, of the kind the Court has created,
seems appropriate.”339 She acknowledged a value system of speech, stating that
“[s]ome speech does not enrich (may even impoverish) the sphere of public discourse.
Other speech contributes to reasoned deliberation on matters of public import. Under
the audience-based approach, it would be perverse to treat these disparate forms of
speech identically. Thus emerges a multitiered system.”340 Kagan envisioned analysis
as to “whether the harm the government is seeking to prevent arises from the
expressive aspect of the communication--or, stated in another way, whether the harm
results from a listener’s hearing the content of speech and reacting to it.”341 Kagan
wrote that the purpose of her Article was to shift “focus from consequences to sources”
of consequences, as has been the Court’s unspoken goal to uncover “improper
governmental motives.”342
Upon her nomination, Dean Chemerinsky cautioned that with Justice Kagan,
“[t]he disadvantage that she poses for President Obama is that neither he nor anyone
else knows exactly where she falls on the ideological spectrum. Everyone expects that
she will be somewhat left of center.”343 Chemerinsky acknowledged that “[m]any
think Justice Kagan will be considerably more moderate than Justice [John Paul]
Stevens,” whom she succeeded on the Court.344
Roughly a decade has passed since Chemerinsky’s disclaimer on President
Obama’s appointment. Without a student free speech case having come before the
Court since Morse or similar precedent by which to gauge Kagan’s ideologies, the
possibility remains for a central shift from Stevens’s dissent. Still, constitutional
theory provides that there exists a general element of ideological shift towards center
among Supreme Court justices.345 Such was the case with Justices Stevens and
O’Connor,346 who shifted left, after having been appointed by Republican
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administrations.347 Similarly, Justice Byron White shifted right after his appointment
by President John F. Kennedy.348
In 2016, Sociology Professor Michael A. McCall and San Diego State University
Professor of Political Science Madhavi M. McCall noted that “Justices Sotomayor and
Kagan seem at home in the left wing of the Court, though their more limited service
to date cautions that this is a tentative assessment.”349 Nevertheless, in First
Amendment jurisprudence, Justice Kagan dissented with Justices Breyer, Ginsburg,
and Sotomayor, asserting that “[t]he First Amendment’s core purpose is to foster a
healthy, vibrant political system full of robust discussion and debate.”350 Participation
in that dissent is indeed consistent with the McCalls’ research on the Court’s left
wing.351 However, the case from which Kagan dissented centered on campaign
finance laws and political action committees.352 Whether Kagan’s sentiments extend
similarly to student speech has yet to be seen. Thus, given Dean Chemerinsky’s
concerns and the general shift that exists across a Justice’s career, the possibility exists
for Kagan to be a swing-vote towards center in a narrow Roberts Court decision to
come. Morse is the last landmark on student free speech rights. The late Justice
Stevens dissented from that case, chiding that the majority “fashion[ed] a test that
trivializes the two cardinal principles upon which Tinker rests” in a “ham-handed”
decision.353 Kagan’s role in such a decision depends upon if she bears the same
ideologies of Stevens, which on this issue has yet to be seen.

g. Justice Sotomayor’s unique student speech experiences on the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Contrary to what Chemerinsky noted about Justice Kagan,354 Justice Sonia
Sotomayor had a body of precedent that could indicate where her ideology may fall
on certain subjects. With regard to student speech, then-Judge Sotomayor
demonstrated her thoughts on this subject.
In a 2008 Second Circuit Court of Appeals case, Doninger v. Niehoff, Judge
Sotomayor and the majority reviewed a case in which a student had been barred from
running as High School Senior Class Secretary “after she posted a vulgar and
347

Ketter, supra note 7; see also, Epstein et al., supra note 334 (President Nixon appointed
Justice Stevens as a Judge to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, prior
to President Gerald Ford appointing him to the U.S. Supreme Court, similarly O’Connor was
appointed to the Supreme Court by President Ronald Reagan).
348
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Bennett, 564 U.S. at 729.
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 437, 445 (2007) (Stevens, J. dissenting).
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misleading message about the supposed cancellation of an upcoming school event on
an independently operated, publicly accessible [blog].”355 In that controversial blog
post, the student wrote that a school event was “cancelled due to douchebags in central
office,” which “is getting a TON of phone calls and emails and such. we have so much
support and we really appreciate [sic] it. however, [they] got pissed off and decided to
just cancel the whole thing all together. anddd [sic] so basically we aren’t going to
have it at all.”356 the Second Circuit held that the student failed to sufficiently
demonstrate a successful First Amendment claim, nevertheless deciding that the
student’s social media post generated “a foreseeable risk of substantial disruption to
the work and discipline of the school.”357
Post-Morse, the Second Circuit noted that “[t]he Supreme Court has yet to speak
on the scope of a school’s authority to regulate expression that, like Avery’s, does not
occur on school grounds or at a school-sponsored event.”358 However, it ruled that
“a student may be disciplined for expressive conduct, even conduct occurring off
school grounds, when this conduct ‘would foreseeably create a risk of substantial
disruption within the school environment,’ at least when it was similarly foreseeable
that the off-campus expression might also reach campus.”359 The Circuit stated that it
was “acutely attentive in this context to the need to draw a clear line between student
activity that ‘affects matter of legitimate concern to the school community,’ and
activity that does not.360 Though Sotomayor’s experience at the appellate level both
predates and postdates Morse.
Prior to Morse, Sotomayor sat on another Second Circuit panel addressing student
speech rights in Guiles v. Marineau.361 In Guiles, the Circuit reviewed an issue of
student speech in which a seventh-grader in 2004 wore an anti-war t-shirt that
criticized President George W. Bush.362 The shirt, featured a photo of the President
and stated that Bush was the “Chicken-Hawk-in-Chief,” as well as a “crook . . . AWOL
draft dodger, lying drunk driver,” on a “World Domination Tour” and accused him of
cocaine and marijuana abuse.363 In that case, the Court noted that “[a]lthough some
students expressed disapproval of [the] shirt, this did not lead to any major disruption
or fights. Some students complained to teachers about the shirt but the teachers
responded that the shirt was permitted.”364 The Circuit noted the lineage of student
355
356
357
358

Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 43 (2d Cir. 2008).
Id. at 45.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 48.

359

Id. at 48 (citing Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied,
128 S. Ct. 1741 (2008)).
360
361
362
363
364

Id.
See generally, Guiles v. Marineau, 349 F. Supp. 2d 871 (D. Vt. 2004).
Guiles, 349 F. Supp. at 873–74.
Id.
Id. at 874.
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speech cases and the exceptions thereto, providing that “[u]nder Fraser,
administrators may ensure that the form or manner of speech is appropriate for the
school setting even though they may not regulate the political content of the speech
unless they satisfy Tinker's disruption test.”365
Prior to the Second Circuit’s Doninger decision, and more importantly, the
Supreme Court’s Morse decision, the Circuit noted that “the most recent Supreme
Court decision addressing school speech is Hazelwood.366 It interpreted Hazelwood
as establishing the proposition that “educators do not offend the First Amendment by
exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in schoolsponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns.”367 In a larger sense, however, the Circuit noted
what Roberts acknowledged later in Morse, that is, the scattered function that flowed
from Tinker onward.368 It stated, “[o]verall, these cases show that different standards
apply in the school setting depending on the content and the context of the speech.”369
Thus, prior to Morse, Sotomayor and the Second Circuit acknowledged that Guiles
was affected greatly by the message itself or the circumstances in which it is
communicated.370 It explained the complicated constitutional terrain that lower courts
must navigate, stating, “[i]n general, if educators censor student speech based on its
political content then, under Tinker, they must have specific grounds for suspecting
that the speech will disrupt the educational environment,” but consequently, “[i]f the
speech occurs in a school-sponsored forum . . . then Hazelwood applies and the
censorship only needs to be reasonably related to educational goals.”371 However, the
Circuit noted that ultimately, “under Fraser, educators may censor speech” unless “the
censorship is unrelated to the political message of the speech and is intended only to
ensure that the speech is not lewd or otherwise offensive.”372 The premise in Guiles
mirrors the logic that Roberts applied in his question at oral argument in Morse.373
Thus, uniquely among her fellow members, Sotomayor, at the appellate level,
navigated, acknowledged, and felt the lack of resolution that Roberts sensed in Morse.
While her reputation on the Court is liberal leaning, Sotomayor’s judicial reasoning
on student speech may be influenced on her experience. Therefore, Sotomayor may

365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372

Id. at 879.
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Id. (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988)).
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vote to restrict Tinker in favor of establishing precedent that does not require appellate
courts to conduct factual undertakings reviewing content and context.

h. Justice Gorsuch, small swinging decisions and context driven.
According to University of Washington School of Law Professor Ronald Collins,
“it is readily apparent that” Neil Gorsuch’s law career bears a “long and informed
commitment to the First Amendment”374 For instance, Justice Gorsuch’s prior
experience on the Tenth Circuit brought the issues of free speech and students
together, in Mink v. Knox albeit in a University context. In that case, a University of
Northern Colorado student, shared a fictional character of his creation on a website
that he maintained. The student based that character on the likeness of a professor at
the school, using altered photos of the professor with a “Hitler-like mustache,” and the
character espoused views “diametrically opposed” to the actual professor.375 The
professor pursued police action under Colorado’s criminal libel statute, and the
defendant’s appeal was reviewed by the Tenth Circuit panel upon which Gorsuch sat.
Judge Gorsuch concurred with the majority that the act was not libelous.376 He
wrote, “I agree with my colleagues that the answer to that question must be ‘no.’ I
reach this conclusion for a simple and straightforward reason: this court has already
said so.”377 Gorsuch, affirmed protections for parody, but noted a caveat that “[t]he
First Amendment does not ‘absolutely protect all verbal means of intentionally
inflicting emotional distress, all forms of racial, sexual, and religious insults, so long
as the offending communications do not contain false factual statements.”378 He
closed with an instruction of judicial minimalism by stating, “[r]espectfully, I would
avoid [the] thickets” of what speech contexts garner protection, “[w]hoever has the
better path through them, it’s better yet that we sidestep them altogether” and “decide
the case currently before us . . . . Beyond that, I would not venture.”379 Finally,
Gorsuch excerpted part of Chief Justice Roberts’s written opinion from when Roberts
sat on the U.S Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in which he wrote
that “the cardinal principle of judicial restraint -- if it is not necessary to decide more,
it is necessary not to decide more -- counsels us to go no further.”380 It is therefore
374

Mark Grabowski, Give Gorsuch a 21st Century Litmus Test, 35 YALE J. ON REG. BULLETIN
1, 6 (citing Ronald Collins, Judge Neil Gorsuch–the Scholarly First Amendment Jurist, FIRST
AMENDMENT NEWS (Feb. 7, 2017), http://mtpress.mtsu.edu/firstamendment/judge-neilgorsuch-the-scholarly-first-amendment-jurist/).
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Id. at 1012 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
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Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601, 602 (1990)) (internal brackets omitted).
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conceivable that Justice Gorsuch could support a majority opinion in which Chief
Justice Roberts elects to craft an opinion to build on Morse that is limited in scope,
proceeding minimally to restrict the precedent and bring clarity to the doctrine.
However, Gorsuch’s potential sympathy to students’ desires may be subjected to
his concepts of classroom order and weariness of technology. For instance, as an
adjunct law professor, Gorsuch prohibited his legal ethics students from the use of
computers in his classroom.381 Ultimately, some believe that Gorsuch’s role on the
Court could impact the manner in which it addresses cases that involve technology.382
Therefore, student speech cases will depend on the context that comes before the
Court, Gorsuch’s reputation for championing First Amendment rights, could be
swayed by factual circumstances of classroom disruption and cyberbullying, leading
him to favor incremental restriction on student speech.

i. Justice Kavanaugh, a swing-voter in other fields, mentored by Justice
Kennedy and Kenneth Starr suggests likely not for student speech.
Justice Kavanaugh replaced Justice Anthony Kennedy, the very Justice for whom
he had previously clerked for with Justice Gorsuch.383 Justice Kennedy was known as
the Court’s “pivotal swing vote.”384 Nevertheless, after Kennedy stepped down in
June of 2018, President Donald Trump filled Kennedy’s vacancy with Justice Brett
Kavanaugh.385 Many believe that the Chief Justice will take Kennedy’s mantle as
swing justice.386 While serving together, both “Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Kennedy . . . vied for the distinction of casting the fewest dissenting votes.”387
Reportedly, Chief Justice Roberts “actually won that race in the 2005, 2007, 2009, and

381
382
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Id. at 7–8 (citing Ars Technica tech policy reporter Joe Silver).
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2011 Terms.”388 Nevertheless, some outlets have suggested that Gorsuch and
Kavanaugh have the potential to function as swing justices.389 Parenthetically, in late
2018, Roberts and Kavanaugh voted in the majority to deny the Court’s review of
abortion rights, a denial of certiorari from which the other conservative-minded, Alito,
Gorsuch, and Thomas, dissented.390 Therefore, Kavanaugh, having served for
Kennedy, seems to have the greatest promise of generally fulfilling the role that his
mentor served on the Court in both function and form. 391 In terms of student speech,
however, it may be best to look at what to date may have shaped Kavanaugh’s thinking
on the subject.
In analyzing Justice Kavanaugh’s potential opinion on student speech from the
lens of Justice Kennedy, who concurred in the majority of Morse,392 this suggests
Kavanaugh could follow similar form and maintain comfort within an incremental
move that follows Morse’s lead away from Tinker. It should be noted, however, that
Kennedy joined Alito’s concurrence.393 Thus, in reference to Alito’s aforementioned
potential for a swing vote, Kavanaugh could be anticipated to join.
Justice Kavanaugh’s potential for decision may be influenced by another one of
his former mentors, Kenneth Starr.394 After clerking for Justice Kennedy, Kavanaugh
worked under Starr in the Office of Independent Counsel.395 Starr reportedly looked
to Kavanaugh as part of the Office’s “brain trust, the lawyers who puzzled over the
many legal and constitutional questions that came up.”396 Kavanaugh, spoke very
highly of Starr in 1999 and said “maybe I’m an optimist. But one day, I, for myself,
hope to be able to call him Mr. Justice Starr.”397 Starr had been considered previously
388
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for a position on the Supreme Court seat under President George H. W. Bush. 398
Nevertheless, while Kavanaugh sat on the D.C. Circuit, Starr represented the school
principal in Morse.399
In a D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals case, Mahoney v. Doe, Kavanaugh concurred
with frank discourse as to where the First Amendment ends when it comes to
protests.400 Appellants, the Christian Defense Coalition, along with Rev. Patrick
Mahoney, Cradles of Love, Inc. and others claimed that a D.C. statute prohibiting
public and private property defacement “violate[d] their First Amendment right to
chalk the 1600 block of Pennsylvania Avenue (literally, the street in front of the White
House).”401 In 2008, the Appellants notified police and the Department of Interior of
their intent to protest via a sidewalk chalk demonstration outside the White House, in
protest of President Obama’s position towards abortion and in light of the anniversary
for Roe v. Wade.402 The police attempted to help facilitate the appellants’ protest but
informed them of the statute and ultimately prevented the sidewalk chalking
demonstration.403 The Circuit acknowledged that the street outside the White House
constitutes a public forum.404 However, it found the D.C. statute was content-neutral,
prohibiting “certain conduct (i.e. disfiguring, cutting, chipping, defacing or defiling),
including certain expressive conduct (i.e. writing, marking, drawing, or painting),” but
“without reference to the message the speaker wishes to convey” and the content
itself.405 It found also that the government’s interest in maintaining physical esthetics
was substantial.406 Thus, no matter how temporary chalking seemed, the Circuit ruled

398
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that this conduct was “defacement of public property” and its prohibition in Mahoney
was constitutional.407
Then-Judge Kavanaugh concurred in the Mahoney majority and echoed the
judicial sentiment of simplifying speech doctrine.408 He wrote,
I add these few words simply because I do not want the fog of First
Amendment doctrine to make this case seem harder than it is. No one has
a First Amendment right to deface government property. No one has a First
Amendment right, for example, to spray-paint the Washington Monument
or smash the windows of a police car.409
Kavanaugh quoted Justice William H. Rehnquist:
One who burns down the factory of a company whose products he dislikes
can expect his First Amendment defense to a consequent arson prosecution
to be given short shrift by the courts. . . . The same fate would doubtless
await the First Amendment claim of one prosecuted for destruction of
government property after he defaced a speed limit sign in order to protest
the stated speed limit.410
Judge Kavanaugh concluded his concurrence, “[w]hen, as here, the Government
applies a restriction on defacement in a content-neutral and viewpoint-neutral fashion,
there can be no serious First Amendment objection.”411 Therefore, Justice Kavanaugh
would conceivably join in a Roberts Court majority opinion to uphold censorship of
student speech that is both content-neutral and viewpoint-neutral. If the next case after
Morse is structured to allow a school to censor any speech disrupting the class,
regardless of its content or viewpoint, Kavanaugh could conceivably join accordingly.
Ultimately, looking to Justice Kavanaugh’s molding influences and his
straightforward jurisprudence, Kavanaugh may be presumed to vote with the Roberts
Court in continuing the mantle of Morse.

5. Possibility for Bench Clearing and Roberts’s Potential Strategy PostMorse
There is a large caveat to the preceding analysis, as the 2020 Presidential election
results will affect who is appointed to the Court in the event of judicial retirement.412
The oldest aged Justices are Ginsburg at eighty-six, Breyer at eighty, and Thomas at
407
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seventy.413 Among those three, Ginsburg and Thomas have exclaimed a strong desire
to remain on the Court, but Washington insiders have suggested Executive plans are
in order should this occur.414
In any case, on its whole, Roberts could craft a decision that limits all disruptive
speech in favor of classroom order, regardless of speaker or message. Joining Chief
Justice Roberts might be Justices Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh, and Gorsuch. That
would be a sufficient majority, though any Justice other than Thomas cannot be truly
expected to rule for further limitation away from Tinker. Justice Ginsburg would be
expected to support the speaker similarly to Morse. Breyer’s desire for factual context
and minimalist judicial decision-making suggests that he might wish to leave TinkerMore as is. Justice Sotomayor seems most situated among the Democrat-appointees
to join a majority opinion that would bring clarity to the lower courts, provided that it
does not subject her principles. Ultimately, Justice Kagan is the least predictable. If a
case for the speech rights of schoolchildren shall come before the Court, these are
factors that Chief Justice Roberts will weigh if he wishes to bring clarity to the doctrine
and ease of application to the lower courts.

C. The Entertainer
In 2018, comedian Roseanne Barr returned to primetime television with her title
series “Roseanne,” which first premiered in 1988.415 A well-received comeback,
Roseanne’s revival reportedly was “the highest-rated comedy show on any network in
four years,” having 18.2 million viewers.416 However, after two months back on the
air, ABC canceled the hit show despite its quick success after Barr wrote an offensive
tweet that reportedly referred to Valerie Jarrett (President Obama’s former Senior
Advisor) and identified her as “vj.”417 Barr tweeted, “Muslim brotherhood & planet
of the apes had a baby=vj.”418 Barr then referred to Chelsea Clinton as “Chelsea Soros
Clinton.”419 Barr’s use of “Soros” referred to billionaire George Soros, whom the New

413
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York Times billed “a major Democratic Party Patron.”420After Clinton clarified that
she was not married or related to a member of the Soros family, Barr apologized to
Clinton and nevertheless tweeted: “By the way, George Soros is a nazi who turned in
his fellow Jews 2 be murdered in German concentration camps & stole their wealthwere you aware of that? But, we all make mistakes, right Chelsea?” 421
A local Fox News affiliate in Arizona reported that “[s]ome have questioned Barr’s
firing, saying she is protected by the First Amendment to say whatever she wants.”422
Nevertheless, the Fox affiliate clarified to its readership that “Roseanne’s relationship
with ABC is really dictated by the contract between the two of them.”423 The National
Review astutely ran an article clarifying that Barr’s termination “is in no way a freespeech or First Amendment issue,” as “ABC simply exercised its own rights as a
private company to decide [with] whom it does and does not want to associate.”424
Therefore, the content of an employment contract will ultimately govern both the
employee’s rights to speech and the ramifications of violations by either party. 425
Barr faced immediate consequences from both the media and the public for her
online statements.426 Following the backlash, Barr tweeted, “let me apologize & make
amends. I begged [Disney-ABC] not to cancel the show.”427 Fellow comedian, and
co-host of “The View,” Whoopi Goldberg, who reviewed Barr’s behavior following
the incident, reportedly expressed suspicion that Barr’s comments were a thinly-veiled
publicity stunt.428 Nonetheless, stunt or not, this is not the first time a comedian
received criticism, “for as long as there has been comedy, there has been offensive
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comedy.”429 MSN reported that comedian Ricky Gervais “is determined to defend
free speech.”430 Gervais said, “I know that I have an immense amount of privilege
which is why I should defend freedom of speech . . . Censorship is a slippery slope.
It’s very odd now . . . It’s being perpetrated and supported by people who think they’re
doing the right thing.” 431 However, Ricky Gervais is not defending free speech, per
se. Not in a constitutional sense. Rather, he is on a crusade for lesser prudence among
those who will backlash against controversial statements.432

1. Comedians and the Courts
In a general sense of Barr’s First Amendment rights, a comedian’s “[ability] to
speak authentically without fear of arrest” is asserted to be the product of comedian
Lenny Bruce.433 Bruce’s live stand-up comedy changed the legal ramifications for
American comedians, but not before at least eight arrests for obscenity and six trials
across four cities.434 Similarly, George Carlin’s standup comedy routine, the “Seven
Words You Cannot Say,” not only landed him in jail for violating obscenity laws, it
made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court docket, in the case of Federal
Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation.435 Justice John Paul Stevens
wrote the opinion for Pacifica, in which the Court reviewed the F.C.C.’s determination
of indecency, and held that the F.C.C.’s action was not “forbidden ‘censorship,’”
under the 1934 Communications Act. 436 Furthermore, the Court upheld the finding
regarding Carlin’s routine that there was “no basis for disagreeing with the
Commission’s conclusion that indecent language was used in this broadcast.”437
Consequently, the Court found that the F.C.C.’s order did not violate the broadcaster’s
First Amendment rights.438 Therefore, in the public arena outside of private contracts,
an entertainer is subject to the restrictive nature of broadcasting, but in the private
arena, rights are indeed established by contract.
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Distinguishably from Bruce and Carlin, who were arrested by government actors
for their respective speech, Barr merely suffered a private entity’s snubbing and public
backlash like that of other entertainers whose “speech” has provoked resentment. For
instance, in 1993, actor, Ted Danson, faced backlash after he sported blackface and
accompanied his then-girlfriend Whoopi Goldberg to a Friars Club roast at which he
served as host and repeatedly used a racial epithet.439
More recently, comedian, Kathy Griffin appeared in a photoshoot in which she
held a prop of a beheaded President Trump.440 CNN parted ways with Griffin in
response.441 Anderson Cooper, Griffin’s CNN co-host, tweeted that he was “appalled
by the photoshoot” and found it “clearly disgusting and completely inappropriate.”442
Time declared that Griffin’s conduct was “free speech” and reported that there are
public “contentions are that this is hate speech, it’s criminal, or it’s treasonous.”443
Time reported, however, “[t]he common factor that the armchair warriors fail to realize
is that all three of those categories demand that the government step in and act to curtail
her vile expression.”444 Time declared that Griffin “unquestionably has the right to
make a fool of herself in this manner. And she should have that right.”445 Yet, while
there is a freedom from government intervention, public backlash is not the equivalent
to a constitutional abridgment of free speech.446 Rather, it is merely the private
consequence of such public speech.
Similarly, the consequences of Barr’s conduct were effected by private actors not
government actors. A constitutional violation of one’s right to free speech under the
First Amendment requires that the violator (or the enforcing party of that violation) is
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a government actor.447 Neither ABC, nor its parent-company Disney, is a government
actor.448 Rather, they were Barr’s private employer.449

2. Constitutionally Misinformed Defense of Entertainers
The backlash that Barr faced is similar to that of Phil Robertson, star of “Duck
Dynasty,” who A&E Network suspended from the filming of that show.450 Robertson
had made controversial statements to GQ about the LGBT community.451 He said,
“start with homosexual behavior and just morph out from there. Bestiality, sleeping
around with this woman and that woman and that woman and those men,” and “don’t
be deceived. Neither the adulterers, the idolaters, the male prostitutes, the homosexual
offenders, the greedy, the drunkards, the slanderers, the swindlers — they won’t
inherit the kingdom of God. Don’t deceive yourself. It’s not right.” 452 He added,
[i]t seems like, to me, a vagina — as a man — would be more desirable
than a man’s anus. That’s just me. I’m just thinking: There’s more there!
She’s got more to offer. I mean, come on, dudes! You know what I’m
saying? But hey, sin: It’s not logical, my man. It’s just not logical. 453
Similar to Disney with Barr, A&E reacted swiftly, releasing a statement through
Variety, in which the network wrote, “[w]e are extremely disappointed to have read
Phil Robertson’s comments in GQ, which are based on his own personal beliefs and
are not reflected in the series Duck Dynasty.”454 It continued that Robertson’s
“personal views in no way reflect those of [A&E] Networks, who have always been
strong supporters and champions of the LGBT community.” 455
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Just as the networks reacted similarly in the cases of Barr and Robertson, the term
“free speech” emerged in both.456 With Robertson, for instance, it was former VicePresidential candidate, Governor Sarah Palin (R-AK), who came to Robertson’s
defense.457 Palin stated, “[f]ree speech is an endangered species. Those ‘intolerants’
hatin’ and taking on the Duck Dynasty patriarch for voicing his personal opinion are
taking on all of us.”458 Similarly, Governor Bobby Jindal (R-LA) also invoked the
Constitution in defense of Robertson, when Jindal stated, “I remember when TV
networks believed in the First Amendment, . . . it is a messed up situation when Miley
Cyrus gets a laugh, and Phil Robertson gets suspended.”459A CNN contributor
chastised Jindal for his flawed constitutional argument, stating that, “a governor
rumored to have his sights on the presidency doesn’t understand the breadth of the
First Amendment.”460 Robertson’s words (like Barr’s) are not, however, protected
from private ramifications. Rather, like the NFL players, the speech rights of
entertainers are subject to the private contractual agreement between the employee
and the employer.461 Nevertheless, principally among those who create and perpetuate
errors in American misunderstanding of free speech are its own elected officials, the
very people who take an oath to uphold that right, among others. 462
More than just Barr and Robertson, both the entertainment industry and the media
covering it freely use the phrase “free speech.” Such invocation of “free speech”
claims with regard to private ramifications from conduct seem to cloud the
public/private line at which constitutional rights end. The confusion over speech runs
deeper in the entertainment industry, however. For instance Deadline, headlined that
“Free Speech Chill Sets Into Hollywood,” in response to Disney firing James Gunn
(director of “Guardians of the Galaxy”) in 2018, for controversial tweets unearthed
years after he published them to Twitter.463 Among Gunn’s tweets were, “I like when
little boys touch me in my silly place,” and “[t]he best thing about being raped is when
you’re done being raped and it’s like ‘whew this feels great, not being raped!’”464
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Disney has since relented and rehired Gunn to direct the third installment to
“Guardians of the Galaxy.”465
In response to Disney’s seemingly disparate treatment, Academy-Award
nominated actor James Woods tweeted, “Oh, and is Roseanne back on Roseanne,
too?”466 Woods himself helped to add to the confusion over entertainers and free
speech rights via Twitter by invoking free speech rights after his agent dropped the
actor from representation due to Woods’s outspoken conservative politics. 467 Woods
thanked his agent for past work, and tweeted, “I was thinking if you’re feeling
patriotic, you would appreciate free speech and one’s right to think as an
individual.”468
Later, in May 2019, Woods announced that he was leaving Twitter after the private
social media company censored another one of his tweets. 469 “It now seems they have
chosen to delete that tweet from my account without my permission. Until free speech
is allowed on Twitter, I will not be permitted to participate in our democracy with my
voice . . . my Twitter days are in the past.”470 In response to Woods’s battle with
Twitter, President Trump tweeted, “How can it be possible that James Woods (and
many others), a strong but responsible Conservative Voice, is banned from Twitter?
Social Media & Fake News Media, together with their partner, the Democrat Party,
have no idea the problems they are causing for themselves. VERY UNFAIR!” 471
Professor Bradley A. Smith of Capital University, who served as chairman of the
Institute for Free Speech, and former chairman of the Federal Election Commission
wrote in City Journal that Twitter, a social media platform like Facebook, is a private
company that has its own free speech rights and may accordingly ban or censor its
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users.472 Smith elaborated that social media platforms “ha[ve] a right to make this
decision; it is not violating the First Amendment.”473 Moreover, he wrote “[a] primary
reason why the Founders adopted the First Amendment was their recognition that” the
government itself could not be the arbiters of what is fair. 474 Rather, “the First
Amendment keeps the government at bay—even when [a notable user] tweets out
poorly formulated views on free speech.”475

3. Statutes, Salutes, and the Star-Spangled Banner
Returning once again to Roseanne Barr, however, her tweeting in 2018 was not
the first time she said or did something unprotected by the First Amendment that
sparked major controversy and constitutional rhetoric.476 For instance, on July 25,
1990, Barr notoriously took the field of a San Diego Padres baseball game to sing the
national anthem.477 Barr’s approach to the anthem was met with boos from the
audience until finally she concluded “the land of the free and the home of the brave”
by grabbing her groin.478 In light of Barr’s performance, President Bush was asked if
there should be a constitutional amendment added to prevent “desecration of the
national anthem,” a question that President George H.W. Bush avoided.479 Her
“interpretation” nevertheless garnered a sharp reaction from Bush. 480 When asked his
thoughts on Barr’s performance, President Bush replied, “[m]y reaction is: It was
disgraceful. That’s the way I feel about it, and I think a lot of the San Diego fans said
the same thing.”481 More colorfully than the reaction Bush gave, however, was
President Trump’s reaction to the more recent NFL kneeling, of which he said,
472
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“Wouldn’t you love to see one of these NFL owners, when somebody disrespects our
flag, to say: ‘Get that son of a bitch off the field right now. Out! He’s fired!’” 482
Neither Kaepernick nor Barr, however, were the first to stir controversy within the
vehicle of the national anthem.483 Famously, at another ball game, on October 7, 1968,
the musician Jose Feliciano sang the anthem at the fifth game of the World Series
between the Detroit Tigers and the St. Louis Cardinals.484 The New York Times
described it then as “controversial.”485 Feliciano’s national anthem was an original
rendition with the well-known words of Francis Scott Key but a melody and chord
progression original to Feliciano.486 Feliciano’s interpretation came late in 1968, a
frantic year in which America’s war in Vietnam reached the Tet Offensive,487 the
National Guard and the Chicago Police battled protestors outside the Democratic
National Convention at which Hubert Humphrey won the nomination for President,488
and America suffered the assassinations of both Martin Luther King, Jr. in Memphis,
Tennessee489 and Robert Kennedy in Los Angeles.490 Feliciano’s “Star-Spangled
Banner” was a poignant commentary on a year that would continue with even more
protests involving the national anthem. Nine days after Feliciano’s controversial
protest, U.S. Olympic Sprinters Tommie Smith and John Carlos took the podium for
the Olympic medaling ceremony, raising their fists in protest during the playing of the
Star-Spangled Banner.491 That moment “[became] an iconic image of the Black Power
482
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movement.”492 More importantly, Feliciano’s anthem was not the first
“interpretation” of the anthem that offended Americans.
Among the earliest controversies involving the anthem was in January 1944, when
the legendary composer Igor Stravinsky offered up his original modern classical
arrangement of the Star-Spangled Banner.493 Stravinsky conducted the Boston
Symphony Orchestra in an orchestral program of his compositions.494 He sought to
offer a different take—a religious quality—to the national anthem.495 Stravinsky said,
“I gave it the character of a church hymn . . . not that of a soldier’s marching song or
a club song, as it was originally.”496 And so, the anthem’s typical fanfare was rather
understated in this arrangement, with complex Stravinsky-esque modern
harmonies.497 After several days of the Boston Symphony performing this concert
program and his original anthem, the Boston Police Commissioner had officers
waiting in the venue on the night of an NBC radio broadcast. 498 Boston Police
Commissioner, Thomas Sullivan, used a World War I-era Massachusetts state statute
that prohibited use of the Star-Spangled Banner for the purposes of dance, used amid
a medley of other songs, or performed with “embellishment.” 499 Stravinsky swapped
the music that evening, however, for a traditional arrangement and suffered no
penalty.500 Reportedly, however, his penalty would have merely been a fine in the
amount of one hundred dollars.501 Nevertheless, the story has grown into a famous
myth that the composer was arrested for his performance.502
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The call for statutes to regulate performances of the national anthem is still alive,
however.503 In 2012, Indiana State Senator, Vaneta Becker (R-Evansville), proposed
a bill to fine national anthem performers (paid or unpaid) for interpretive
deviations.504 Senator Becker defended her bill to the Los Angeles Times and stated,
“[i]t’s not like we’re going after anyone’s ability to sing,” rather, “[w]e just want them
to respect the words and the tune as it was originally intended and we normally sing
it.”505 However, as a matter of constitutional law, Senator Becker’s bill did involve
legally “going after” someone’s “ability to sing.”506 As Justice Kennedy wrote in
Ward v. Rock Against Racism,“[m]usic is one of the oldest forms of human
expression.”507 In order for national anthem regulation to meet a constitutional
muster, the “content-neutral time, place, or manner regulation [must] be narrowly
tailored, it must not ‘burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the
government’s legitimate interests.’”508
Senator Becker’s goal envisioned a statutorily-mandated patriotic
interpretation.509 Such a pursuit mirrors the governmental failed efforts to regulate the
“expressive conduct” of respect for the American flag, a pursuit of which the Court
has held that “the State’s interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and
national unity [does not] justify [a] criminal conviction for engaging in political
expression.”510 The state interest in mandating respect for the Star-Spangled Banner
is no different than preventing flag desecration. Furthermore, the interpretive whims
of an anthem performer are individually unique, as both contemporary and classical
musicians “interpret . . . and improvise in doing so.”511 Dr. Mark Clague, associate
professor of musicology at the University of Michigan and “[o]ne of the nation’s
foremost experts on ‘The Star-Spangled Banner,’” has helped to rectify the
misconception that there is somehow “a sanctioned traditional or otherwise official
version of ‘The Star-Spangled Banner.’”512 Rather, the 1931 Act that made Key’s
503
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song the national anthem “does not identify an official arrangement, in part because
the song as sung in the 20th century had already departed from what Key had
known.”513 Failed attempts occurred nevertheless, according to Dr. Clague: during
World War I, “attempts were made to codify the arrangement,” which “result[ed] in
both a military ‘Service Version’ and a ‘Standardized Version’ endorsed by the
Department of Education.”514 Therefore, Becker’s mandate for “the tune,” envisions
the way “we normally sing it.”515 It is a fool’s errand both musically and
constitutionally, as this conceived traditional interpretation is not even what the
composer wrote.516 Therefore, the unattainable utopia of which Senator Becker seeks,
a “respect [for] the words and the tune as it was originally intended and we normally
sing it”517 is in itself an interpretation. When restricted via statute, such a restriction
on the bounds of expression is a censorship of content.518 Furthermore, it is an
infringement on the rights under the First Amendment, and it is executed by a state
actor (not a private entity).
Two years before Justice Robert Jackson would serve as a chief prosecutor at the
Nuremberg Trials over Nazi party members in the wake of World War II, 519 he
captured the American dedication to free speech when he wrote with regard to
compulsory participation in the pledge of allegiance on behalf of the Court:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess
by word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which
permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.
We think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute
and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their power and invades
the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First
Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control. 520
Simply put, the government cannot cross the thresholds of compelled speech for
any reason without violating the principles of the Constitution, regardless of general
concern compellingly centered in politics, nationalism, religion or otherwise.521
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Nevertheless, the First Amendment protects the individual from “official control.”522
To be clear, however, while private environments such as the NFL, the Major League
Baseball Association, or the Boston Symphony Orchestra are not constitutionallyprevented from dictating the manner in which the Star-Spangled Banner shall be
performed or received in that environment, it is the government that is expressly
prohibited from exerting such “official control.”523 Thus, private requirements from a
venue restricting a performer may stand muster for the nature of the private actor. 524

4. Entertainers, Employment Law, and Free Speech
Compelled speech, however, can be required by employers both public and
private. For instance, attorneys are not constitutionally free from compelled speech,
as a state may bar admission of any applicant who refuses to take the oath to uphold a
state or federal Constitution due to a rational connection between the required oath
and the practice of law itself.525 The Court stated that it was “not persuaded that
careful administration of such a system” requiring as New York’s need result in
chilling effects upon the exercise of constitutional freedoms.”526 Rather, oath
requirements had a rational relationship to serve a “principal means of policing the
Bar” and affirming the significance of law itself with “deterrent and punitive effects
of such post-admission sanctions as contempt, disbarment, malpractice suits, and
criminal prosecutions.”527
This is not to say, however, that First Amendment rights of entertainers do not
exist. Recently, California’s Second District Court of Appeal ruled in favor of
musician, Eddie Money (Mahoney) in Symmonds v. Mahoney.528 Money had
terminated his drummer, Glenn Symmonds, after Symonds suffered a back injury that
made lifting difficult.529 Symmonds also suffered from incontinence caused by
cancer, requiring the drummer to wear diapers. 530 The appellate court opinion stated
that “[d]uring concerts [Money] would joke about Symmonds’ [sic] condition to the
audience, referring to Symmonds as ‘Chemo the Drummer’ (a reference to
chemotherapy), and stating that the concert tour was sponsored by ‘Depends,’ . . . a
brand of ‘diaper used by people with urinary incontinence.”531 Eventually, in 2015,
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Money terminated the whole band but rehired all, except for Symmonds.532
Symmonds sued Money for employment discrimination based on the drummer’s age,
disability, and medical condition.533 Nevertheless, in February 2019, the appellate
court ruled in favor of Money, holding that “[a] singer’s selection of the musicians
that play with him both advances and assists the performance of the music, and
therefore is an act in furtherance of his exercise of the right of free speech.”534 The
case was covered by the Hollywood Reporter, which accurately reflected the Court’s
declaration of Money’s free speech rights.535
Entertainers and athletes are simply among the greater regulatable class of the
employed. In Waters v. Churchill, a plurality opinion written by Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor, the Court upheld the dismissal of a government employee, holding in part
“that the government as employer indeed has far broader powers than does the
government as sovereign.”536 It stated furthermore that an “at-will government
employee . . . generally has no claim based on the Constitution at all.”537 Justice
Stevens, dissented from the majority, while noting nonetheless that “[a]bsent some
contractual or statutory provision limiting its prerogatives, a privatesector employer may discipline or fire employees for speaking their minds.”538
Indeed, some corporate employers may tread the line as to whether they qualify as
government actors in the constitutional sense.539 For instance, if “the Government
creates a corporation by special law, for the furtherance of governmental objectives,
and retains for itself permanent authority to appoint a majority of the directors of that
corporation, the corporation is part of the Government for purposes of
the First Amendment.”540 Those types of employers are, however, part of a rare
dividing line of trees in a forest of employers public and private. For the reasons
aforementioned regarding state action analysis, the sports and entertainment industry
constitute general employment over which the employers have control, pursuant to
Garcetti v. Ceballos. However, even in the context of state action, the Court has
granted much deference to government employers.541 Therefore, as Justice Stevens

532
533
534

Id. at 450.
Id. at 449.
Id. at 454.

535

Ashley Cullins, Eddie Money’s Decision to Fire Drummer Was Expression of Free Speech,
Court Rules, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thresq/eddie-moneys-firing-drummer-was-expression-free-speech-court-rules-1182348.
536
537
538
539
540
541

Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994).
Id. at 679.
Id. at 694–95.
Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 399 (1995).
Id.
Id. at 679.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2020

63

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

484

[68:421

noted in Waters, the remedy for employees is in contract and statute, but not the
Constitution.542

III. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, when it comes to the rights of entertainers and NFL players, the terms
of the contract will largely govern the relationship with the employing entity,
regardless of state action. The Court’s precedent on employee censorship, preceding
the Roberts Court’s decisions benefited employers, even before its enunciations on
state-action. Thus, at a federal level, the NFL and entertainers will not benefit from
the Roberts Court, their remedy is at the state level.
For schoolchildren, however, it depends on whether the school in which the child
is enrolled is public or private. For now, at least, private schoolchildren do benefit
from Tinker. Therefore, while the NFL and ABC may censor employee conduct, the
Court has made clear that public schoolchildren do not “shed their constitutional rights
to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” 543 Thus, with regard to
the NFL player, the schoolchild, the entertainer, and exactly “Who’s on First” for the
Roberts Court, it is the public schoolchild who may see changes to Court precedent.544
Going forth, it is the duty of the press, expressly protected by the Constitution, to
make these distinctions and fully inform the public as to the protections of free speech.
It is also the duty of America’s elected officials, who take an oath to uphold the
Constitution, that they adequately understand such rights guaranteed under the First
Amendment. Finally, it is the duty of the people to whom the First Amendment
guarantees its protections to strive for continual understanding of just what is free
speech and when it comes to America’s NFL players, its schoolchildren, and its
entertainers, “who’s on first.”545 Nevertheless, for schoolchildren, Chief Justice John
Roberts may guide the Court to reduce confusion.
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